Optimal Exchange Rate Policy: The Case of Iceland by Már Guðmundsson et al.
CENTRAL BANK OF ICELAND
WORKING PAPERS No. 8
Optimal Exchange Rate Policy:
The Case of Iceland
by
Már Guðmundsson, Thórarinn G. Pétursson and Arnór Sighvatsson
May 2000
CENTRAL BANK OF ICELAND
Economics Department2
Central Bank of Iceland Working Papers are published by the Economics Department
of the Central Bank of Iceland. The views expressed in them are those of their authors
and not necessarily the views of the Central Bank of Iceland.
Also available on the Central Bank of Iceland World Wide Web site
(http://www.sedlabanki.is)
All rights reserved. May be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated.
ISSN: 1028-94453
Optimal Exchange Rate Policy:
The Case of Iceland
Már Guðmundsson
*
, Thórarinn G. Pétursson
†




This paper analysis the appropriate exchange rate arrangement for Iceland,
given its structural characteristics, on the one hand, and the need for a
credible nominal anchor for monetary policy, on the other. It also
discusses the current regime of a currency peg, its rationale, its success in
terms of achieving its goals, and how the apparent conflict between the
exchange rate arrangement suggested by the structural characteristics of
the economy and the arrangement actually chosen, has been resolved.
Finally, the paper provides an assessment of alternative future exchange
rate regimes.
Keywords: Exchange rate regime, Optimal currency area, Iceland
JEL Classification: E52
                                               
* Chief Economist and Director of Economics Department, Central Bank of Iceland. † Division Chief,
Economics Department, Central Bank of Iceland and Reykjavík University. ‡ Division Chief, Central
Bank of Iceland. Forthcoming in Macroeconomic Policy: Small Open Economies in an Era of Global
Integration, edited by Már Guðmundsson, Tryggvi T. Herbertsson and Gylfi Zoëga, University of
Iceland Press. We are grateful for useful comments from Palle S. Andersen and Bjarni B. Jónsson and
from participants at seminars held at the University of Iceland and the Central Bank of Iceland and
from participants at a conference held by the Institute of Economic Studies at the University of Iceland
and the Central Bank of Iceland, 28 to 29 May 1999 and at the International Symposium on Economic
Modelling in Maribor, Slovenia, 30 June to 2 July 1999. We are also grateful to Norman Morin, Anders
Warne and Henrik Hansen for providing us with their Rats codes for estimating the structural VAR
models. The usual disclaimer applies. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those
of the Central Bank of Iceland.2
1. Introduction
Icelandic financial markets have undergone radical structural changes during the last
two decades. Domestic interest rates and external capital movements were highly
regulated in the early 1980s but have now been almost completely liberalised.
Although highly beneficial from the standpoint of economic efficiency, these changes
can make the economy more vulnerable to surges in capital flows. Iceland succeeded
in reducing inflation from the high range in the early eighties to below 2% per year in
the middle of the nineties. Exchange rate stability was one of the cornerstones of the
successful disinflation strategy.1
The full liberalisation of financial markets and the end of the disinflation process
has called into question whether the current exchange rate regime remains appropriate
for the Icelandic economy. Although there have been substantial changes in the
implementation of exchange rate policy, with the goal of price stability more
prominent than before, the formal arrangement of using the exchange rate as the
intermediate target and the cornerstone of monetary policy still remains intact. Some
have argued that the costs for Iceland of having its own currency, reflected in e.g.
high interest rate differentials, are far bigger than the benefits and have thus argued
for adopting the euro as a legal tender, either unilaterally or through EMU
membership (which of course implies EU membership). Others have pointed out that
while the current regime was very important during the disinflation process, the long-
run sustainability of the regime is questionable. A more flexible exchange rate is
therefore argued for, adopting an alternative monetary anchor.
This paper sets out to analyse in detail the appropriate exchange rate arrangement
for Iceland, given its structural characteristics, on the one hand, and the need for a
framework for monetary policy that enhances the credibility of the goal of low
inflation, on the other. The inflationary bias of monetary policy in the past is still
having a negative influence on its credibility today and restraining choices of
monetary frameworks. The paper also discusses the rationale for the choice of the
current regime of a currency peg, and how successful it has been in achieving its
goals. The paper then tries to explain how the apparent conflict between the exchange
rate arrangement suggested by the structural characteristics of the economy and the
one actually chosen, has been resolved. Finally, the paper discusses alternative
policies that could be pursued in the context of increasingly agile capital markets and
the advent of the euro.
                                               
1 See Andersen and Guðmundsson (1998) for an analysis of the disinflation process in Iceland.3
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a historical
account of exchange rate policy in Iceland, assessing its successes and failures in the
last three decades. Section 3 analysis the optimal currency area (OCA) criteria for
Iceland. The findings suggest that Iceland fails to fulfil all, or most, of the OCA
criteria for a successful euro-peg, suggesting that the structural characteristics of the
economy all support a flexible exchange rate regime. Section 4 discusses some
limitations to the OCA framework. Section 5 discusses the establishment of the EMU
and the single currency and possible effects on the króna. It is argued that a successful
implementation of EMU will have positive effects on growth and stability in Iceland.
The effects will, however, depend critically on which countries will finally join the
union. Section 6 discusses possible future monetary policy options for Iceland. The
alternatives to the current arrangement considered are an inflation target, various
forms of euro-pegs, adoption of the euro as a legal tender and direct participation in
the EMU. Considering the long-run vulnerability of the current regime (and other
unilateral pegs) and the fact that a bilateral agreement with EMU or full EMU
membership are rather unlikely at present, it is argued that an inflation target might
offer more flexibility and credibility than the current regime and be more consistent
with the structural characteristics of the Icelandic economy. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2. A Review of the Icelandic Exchange Rate Arrangement
2.1. History of exchange rate policy in Iceland
The history of exchange rate policy in Iceland broadly reflects international
developments. Iceland started the century in a monetary union and ironically, as the
century draws to a close, the question of belonging to a monetary union has again
become relevant. Table 1 provides an outline of the various phases of Icelandic
exchange rate arrangements through the 20
th century. 2
                                               
2 This summary draws from a review of the history of Icelandic exchange rate policy over the period
from 1922 to 1973 in Nordal and Tómasson (1995). A review of exchange rate development from 1973
to 1989 is provided by Felixson and Jónsson (1989). A discussion of exchange rate policy in the 1990s
is in Guðmundsson and Kristinsson (1997).4
Table 1. Exchange rate policy episodes in Iceland
Period Characteristics of exchange rate regime
1873-1914 Nordic currency union, gold standard.
1914-1922 Gold standard abolished in August 1914, but parity with Danish krone maintained.
1922-1925 After a 23% devaluation against the Danish krone in June 1922, a floating exchange rate
regime is established. The British pound replaces the Danish krone as a reference
currency. The króna depreciates against the pound until 1924, after which the króna
appreciates under a policy of revaluation.
1925-1939 Iceland’s longest period of exchange rate stability. After the pound was taken off the gold
standard in 1931 the króna and other Nordic currencies continued to be linked to the
pound. Icelandic authorities responded to a deteriorating competitive position by foreign
exchange restrictions and protectionism.
1939-1945 After 14 years of exchange rate stability the króna was devalued by 18% in the spring of
1939. As terms of trades improved and the pound depreciated, the króna was linked to the
US dollar. Over the period the króna depreciated against the dollar but appreciated
against the pound. An overheated economy led to a surge in inflation, leading to doubling
of domestic relative to foreign prices over the period.
1946-1949 Growing external imbalances in the first years after the war were initially cushioned by
very large foreign exchange reserves and favourable external conditions, but were at a
later stage met by extensive capital controls and protectionism. In 1949, when the pound
(and soon after most other European currencies) was devaluated by 30½% against the
dollar, it was decided to let the króna follow the pound. Due to the large share of
European countries in Icelandic trade, however, the country’s competitive position did
not change much as a result of it.
1950 After Iceland became a founding member of the IMF in 1947, an attempt was made to
bring the external accounts closer towards a sustainable equilibrium under liberalised
trade. This included a 42,6% devaluation of the króna. This experiment failed i.a. due to
unfavourable external conditions. Moreover the devaluations did not seem to be sufficient
to bring about sustainable external balance.
1951-1959 After the devaluation of 1950 failed to achieve external balance, a regime of multiple
exchange rates and extensive export subsidies was established. The arrangement implied
a substantial effective devaluation, but did not suffice to balance the external account.
1960-1970 A more fundamental and far reaching effort to restore sustainable external balance was
made in 1960, when the króna was devalued by 1/3 to 57%, depending on the relevant
exchange rate premium on foreign exchange transactions. In effective terms, this brought
the real exchange rate back to the level of 1914 and 1939 and much lower than in 1950.
The devaluation was followed up by extensive trade liberalisation. Moreover, the
flexibility of the exchange rate regime was enhanced, as the Central Bank assumed the
power to change the exchange rate, no longer requiring a change in law. During the
period the króna was devalued on several occasions in response to external as well as
internal macroeconomic disturbances.5
Table 1. Exchange rate policy episodes in Iceland (continued)
Period Characteristics of exchange rate regime
1970-1973 After the Bretton-Woods system of pegged but adjustable exchange rates fell apart and
the dollar was devalued, the Icelandic króna broadly followed the dollar. During this
period, however, the króna was devalued once (1972) and revalued twice (1973) against
the dollar, until the króna was effectively floated in December 1973.
1974-1989 During the period to 1983 the Icelandic exchange rate regime became increasingly
flexible and could be characterised as managed floating. However, in the mid-1980s the
monetary and exchange rate policy stance became more restrictive. Over the period 1974
to 1989 the króna was devalued 25 times. Moreover, the króna was allowed to depreciate
gradually (without formal announcements) during the period Mars 1975 to January 1978.
An effective devaluation was also achieved in 1986 and 1987 by changing the currency
basket. Over brief intervals the value of the króna was kept stable, first against the dollar
and then against various baskets of trading partner currencies.
1990- During the 1990s the role of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor received stronger
emphasis. A path-breaking moderate wage settlement in early 1990 was supported by a
public commitment to a stable exchange rate, which became the cornerstone of a
disinflation strategy that proved successful. However, there have been two devaluations
during the 1990s, in 1992 and 1993, in both cases in response to external shocks.
As the review in Table 1 indicates, the exchange rate regime has gone through
fundamental changes throughout the 20
th century. In the last 30 to 40 years we have
seen a gradual return to the environment of relatively free trade that characterised the
beginning of century. One could argue that these periods of relatively free trade were
only interrupted by two world wars and a depression that led to extensive restrictions
on international trade and capital movements. The restrictions imposed in the wake of
the Great Depression and World War II took a long time to unwind, especially in
Iceland.  There have been two relatively brief periods of floating or semi-floating
exchange rates, the first one in the context of a return to a liberal trading regime after
World War I and the second after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods fixed rate
system.
Otherwise, the Icelandic króna has been pegged against or at least managed with
respect the currency of some trading partner country or a basket of currencies, but
with varying degree of adjustability and commitment. Consequently, the line between
a peg and managed floating is often rather blurred. At times commitment has been so
weak that the exchange rate regime could be characterised as one of managed
floating, rather than an adjustable peg.
It is interesting to note that when looking at the development of the real exchange
rate over the period from 1914 to date, one may conclude that, excluding the two
periods of extensive restrictions of foreign trade and foreign exchange transactions,
there is no obvious trend in the real exchange rate, indicating that PPP may indeed
hold in the very long run. Over the medium term, however there has been substantial6
variability, though deviations have tended to moderate in recent decades.3 Figure 1
shows the development of the real exchange rate (all the data used in this paper is
described in Appendix C).










Figure 1. The real exchange rate 1914 – 1998
In the following section we will take a closer look at the post Bretton-Woods era
and the rationale behind the exchange rate policies that were adopted in an
environment of floating exchange rates of the main currencies.
2.2. The motivation of exchange rate policies in the 1970s and 1980s
The post Bretton-Woods era can be roughly divided into two periods with respect to
exchange rate regime. The first one spans the period from 1973 to 1989 and is
characterised by a highly accommodative exchange rate policy with frequent
adjustments, on average about 1½ times per year if two periods of gradual
depreciation are not counted.  The latter spans the period from 1990 to date. During
this period exchange rate policy has been much less accommodative, notwithstanding
two devaluations in 1992 and 1993. During both periods the Central Bank statute was
basically guided by the same principles. According to the law, the Central Bank has
multiple but potentially conflicting objectives. The Bank should aim to maintain a
stable exchange rate, but in such a way as to maintain external balance and a
sufficiently competitive position of export and import competing industries.
It is debatable whether the 1973-1989 period should be characterised as one of
managed floating or rather adjustable peg with a heavy emphasis on adjustability.
When the flexibility of the exchange rate regime is evaluated, it is not enough to look
at the frequency of exchange rate adjustment. The structure of the economy, its
                                               
3 The finding that deviations from PPP are large and persistent is not specific to Iceland. See, for
example, Rogoff (1996). A Dickey-Fuller unit root test rejects a unit root in the real exchange rate at7
regulatory environment as well as the external conditions that contributed to
conditions of chronically overheated economy with high inflation all need to be
considered. During this period, the Icelandic economy was still highly regulated.
Interest rates were, for instance, not liberalised until the mid-1980s. As a result, in the
highly inflationary environment, real interest rates became negative over protracted
periods. At the height of the inflation cycle in 1979-1983, the real interest rate on non-
indexed bank loans averaged -9.8%. Maintaining exchange rate stability in an
environment of much higher inflation than in trading partner countries with very
limited ability to use monetary instruments to support such a policy would hence have
been extremely difficult. During the 1980s the effective monetary stance was
progressively tightened by the introduction of financial indexation and the gradual
liberalisation of interest rates in 1984 to 1986. These developments can be seen as
important prerequisites for the more restrictive exchange rate policy adopted during
the 1990s.
The frequency of exchange rate adjustments during the 1970s and 1980s was also
affected by external economic conditions. Thus, external conditions were highly
conducive to a rapid rate of capital accumulation in the country’s main export
industry, the fisheries.4 The scope for expanding output via capital accumulation,
rather than increasing total factor productivity, during these two decades, contributed
to a chronic shortage of labour and constant pressure on wages. In turn, this led to a
rapid erosion of the competitive position of other industries and a rising real exchange
rate during each short period of stable nominal effective exchange rate. At the same
time, notwithstanding an external environment generally conducive to growth, the
frequency of negative external shocks rose (see Andersen and Guðmundsson, 1998).
Widespread use of wage indexation early in the period added further fuel to the fire
and posed a serious dilemma for policy makers when the exchange rate was adjusted
in response to external shocks.
This can be seen in Figure 2 which shows the development of inflation, exchange
rate depreciation and the growth of export revenue, which can be used as a proxy for
external shocks.5 As the figure shows, inflation usually peaks one or two years after
the economy is hit by negative external shocks (measured by a decline in export
revenue) and these peaks are always associated with a devaluation of the króna.
                                                                                                                                      
the 5% critical level, supporting the claim that the real exchange rate is stationary.
4 Iceland’s exclusive economic zone (fishing limits) was expanded from 12 to 200 nautical miles in two
steps, encouraging investment in the marine sector to fill the gap left by other nations. Investment was
further encouraged by a public policy to build up industries outside the capital area.
5 Export revenue is defined as exports of goods and services in current prices, deflated by import
prices. It thus measures the purchasing power of exports against imports.8








Inflation Exchange rate depreciation Real export revenue
Figure 2. Inflation, exchange rate depreciation and export revenue (%)
The frequent exchange rate adjustments during the 1970s and 1980s not only
reflect an accommodative policy stance, but are, to some degree, also resulted from a
dearth of other means of adjustment in an external environment conducive to over-
investment that was further encouraged by structural policies. At the same time,
Iceland’s proneness to external shocks demanded frequent exchange rate adjustment
to keep the external inbalance within limits. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence
that Icelandic exchange rate policy during this period was characterised by a
devaluation bias (cf. Andersen and Guðmundsson, 1998). A great importance was
attached to maintaining a very high level of employment and indicators of the
competitive position of industries carried a considerable weight in the formation of
policies. Notwithstanding high and increasing inflation, the real exchange rate of the
króna was generally on a declining trend from the end of the Bretton-Woods era to the
early 1980s, when inflation was at its peak. This can be seen in Figure 3, which shows
the real exchange rate from 1980 and the current account as a percentage of GDP.
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Figure 3. The real exchange rate and the current account deficit9
When facing external shocks, the exchange rate was adjusted such as to maintain
a high level of employment, with unemployment rates almost always within 1%
between 1970 and 1989. On the other hand, the exchange rate was hardly ever
revalued when positive shocks hit the economy. Indeed the labour market was in a
chronic state of excess demand, as indicated by vacancy rates that exceeded the
unemployment rate until 1989, as seen in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Unemployment and vacancies (%)
Hence, one may conclude, that a disproportionate burden of adjustment was
placed on the exchange rate relative to fiscal policy. Moreover, as pointed out by
Andersen and Guðmundsson (1998), a comparison of the size of external shocks (as
measured by the cumulative change in real export revenue) and the resulting
cumulative devaluations, indicates that until the mid 1980s the bias became
progressively stronger.
After inflation had reached its peak during the early months of 1983 and
threatened to become even higher a range of stabilisation measures were implemented
that included a policy of exchange rate stability, following an initial devaluation of
15%. Other measures included suspension of wage indexation, ceiling on wage
increases for the rest of the year and compensatory social security and tax changes.
These measures succeeded in bringing inflation down from a peak of about 80% to
about 30%. The inflation rate stayed close to that level for the next three years, but
failed to adjust to the level of the main trading partners. Consequently, the
competitive position deteriorated sharply, by more than 17% between 1984 and 1988
(see Figure 3), despite a substantial nominal depreciation. With continued rapid
growth of domestic demand, the deteriorating competitive position led to a growing
imbalance in the current account and an unsustainable build up of foreign liabilities.
This cycle of inflation and devaluation was not broken until at the end of 1989.10
2.3. The motives for exchange rate policy in the 1990s
There was a clear shift in the priorities of economic policy makers towards stronger
emphasis on price stability around 1990. The experience with high inflation in the
preceding two decades was a large factor behind this shift, but international trends
towards greater emphasis on price stability probably played a role too. In terms of
exchange rate policy the shift led to an increasing emphasis on the role of the
exchange rate as a monetary anchor rather than an instrument of adjustment. A policy
of exchange rate stability played a vital role in the disinflation process that brought
inflation down from the high levels of the preceding decades to a level comparable to
that of the main trading partner countries. The success of this policy in achieving
rapid disinflation is rather unique in international comparison as described in
Andersen and Guðmundsson (1998). The conflict between the role of the exchange
rate as a monetary anchor, on the one hand, and the principal adjustment price in a
volatile economy, on the other, was though still present, as reflected by two
devaluations during the 1990s. Indeed, the policy of adjustable peg can be seen as a
compromise between these two functions of the exchange rate.
Although the policy of managed floating had worked reasonably well during the
1970s and 1980s in terms of adjusting the real side of the economy to external shocks
and keeping unemployment low, its inflationary bias was a side effect that became
increasingly unpopular among policy makers and the public. Arguably, the policy
may also have been harmful to long-term growth by shielding export industries
excessively from external shocks, hence providing little incentive for internal
adjustment. In December 1989 a period of gradual depreciation came to an end and a
policy of having a stable exchange rate against a trade-weighted basket of currencies
was announced. This marked the beginning of a period of exchange rate stability that
has lasted to this date. Even during this period, policies were shifting from time to
time in terms of commitment to exchange rate stability, the flexibility by which the
stable exchange rate policy was executed and the basket of currencies to which
reference was made.
In the first years this renewed commitment to exchange rate stability, the króna
was kept completely stable against a basket of currencies. Although there was a
formal exchange rate band of –2¼%, it was not used. This rigidity in the
implementation of the policy does not necessarily reflect the degree of commitment to
exchange rate stability but rather the underdevelopment of the domestic foreign
exchange market.6  An interbank market for foreign exchange did not exist at that
                                               
6 It was argued that without a functioning inter-bank market for foreign exchange, changes within the
formal fluctuation limits would lack credibility and any depreciation be interpreted as a permanent11
time.7 In 1990 and 1991 a trade-weighted basket of 17 currencies was used, but in
early 1992 the composition of the basket was changed such as to give more weight to
the ERM currencies. The trade-weighted basket was replaced with one composed of
the ECU (76%), USD (18%) and the Japanese yen (6%), reflecting the relative trade
weights of Europe, North-America and Japan respectively. The change was made in
the wake of a decision by Iceland’s Nordic neighbours to peg the currencies of
Norway, Sweden and Finland to the ECU and by Britain to join the ERM. It was
considered an intermediate step towards a full ECU-link, pending a decision to be
made in 1993. The most significant change was the reduced weight of the pound (to
ca. 10% whereas around 25% of merchandise trade is with Britain). Furthermore,
although the Nordic currencies remained in the basket through their ECU pegs, their
weights were smaller than actual trade would suggest.






Basket of 17 currencies, weighted
by share in merchandise trade.




ECU (76%), USD (18%),
JPY (6%).
–2¼% Interbank market for foreign
exchange established in May
1993. Devaluations in November
1992 (6%) and July 1993 (7%).
Sept. 1995 – Basket of 16 currencies, weighted
by share in trade in goods and
non-factor services.
–6% Daily fixing abolished and banks
assume responsibility as market
makers in 1997.
The change in the basket can be seen as a further step in the direction of a hard
currency policy, as the composition of the new basket was intended to give more
weight to the currencies of low inflation countries, notably the German mark.
However, the risk associated with this hardening of exchange rate policy and its
credibility implications may not have been fully appreciated. A smooth sailing
towards a monetary union was generally assumed and hence the risk of an unintended
change in effective exchange rates, resulting from a composition of the currency
                                                                                                                                      
devaluation and hence have larger impact on the domestic price level than a transitory market driven
change in the exchange rate. See Sighvatsson (1992).  However, the lack of liquidity in the inter-bank
market when it was in its infancy and hence heavy Central Bank involvement, blurred the distinction
between the two arrangements. Another argument for keeping rather narrow fluctuation limits in the
period immediately following the commencement of the inter-bank foreign exchange market was that
widening of the fluctuation limits might be misinterpreted as a weakening of the commitment to
exchange rate stability.
7 Before the inter-bank market was established, the exchange rate was fixed unilaterally by the Central
Bank each morning. The banks were then required to use the fixed rates during the remainder of the
day. With the liberalisation of capital and foreign exchange transactions this system became untenable.12
basket that diverged significantly from Iceland’s patterns of trade and the rigidity of
the exchange rate arrangement, was discounted. Had the Nordic currencies and the
pound remained stable against the ECU as intended, the change in the basket would
not have substantially affected the effective exchange rate of the króna. But as it
turned out, the withdrawal of the pound from the ERM and the floating of the Nordic
currencies in the autumn of 1992 led to an unintended appreciation of the króna.
The Icelandic authorities responded to the disturbances by devaluing the króna by
6% in November 1992 (see Figure 5), a somewhat larger devaluation than warranted
by the preceding “technical” effective appreciation. The action indicates that although
the shift towards an ECU peg reflected a desire by the authorities to achieve greater
price stability on the basis of a hard currency policy, they were not willing to face the
consequences of a relatively modest shock to the terms of trade, despite earlier
rhetoric that devaluations were a thing of the past. The króna was devalued again in
July 1993, this time as a result of an external shock caused by a severe cut in fishing
quotas and falling marine export prices. The devaluations of 1992 and 1993 were
successful in term of lowering the real exchange rate and both were pre-emptive in the
sense that in neither case was there any sign of a speculative attack against the króna.
It should be noted, however, that this was before the full liberalisation of international
capital movements.
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Figure 5. The official exchange rate index and exchange rate bands
Following the devaluations of 1992 and 1993 and the debacle of the ERM in
1993, which led to the adoption of a –15% fluctuation band for the ERM currencies,
there was an increasing awareness, both domestically and internationally, of the risk
of a one way speculation against a currency under a rigid exchange rate regime in an
environment of liberalised capital movements. This risk was further demonstrated
during the Mexican crisis in 1994 to 1995 and later in Asia and other emerging
markets. The changes in the exchange rate arrangement that were made in the autumn13
of 1995 reflected increasing scepticism concerning rigid exchange rate regimes. The
ERM crisis of 1993 seemed to demonstrate that narrow exchange rate bands could
encourage one-way bets against a currency.  In September 1995 the exchange rate
band was widened from –2¼% to –6% and a trade-weighted currency basket of 16
currencies was adopted, which, unlike previous trade-weighted baskets, included
none-factor services and third-country effects. In practice, the widening of the
fluctuation bands did not have much immediate significance. The previous narrow
bands of –2¼% had in fact hardly been used at all, even after the interbank market for
foreign exchange was established in 1993, and, for a year and half, the widening of
the exchange rate bands did not lead to significant changes.
The changes made in the autumn of 1995 were not intended to weaken the
commitment to a stable exchange rate. An effort was made to send a clear message to
the markets that the changes were not to be understood as an indication that the
commitment of the authorities to exchange rate stability had weakened. The Central
Bank intervened quite actively in the market during the year following the
announcement in order to secure the stability of the exchange rate and so underscore
its commitment. This activist policy was not relaxed in any significant way until 1997,
when the króna was allowed to appreciate somewhat. The basis for a less
interventionist policy was improved in July 1997, when the daily fixing sessions at the
Central Bank were terminated and the banks assumed the obligation to quote two-way
prices on a continuous basis.
To summarise, during the 1990s exchange rate policy became more restrictive
than in the preceding decades of the post Bretton-Woods era, although the emergence
of an interbank foreign exchange market in 1993 also provided some scope for
introducing some short term flexibility. More importantly, economic policies were in
general more supportive of exchange rate stability. They involved a reorientation of
policy priorities away from maintaining full employment towards reducing inflation
in a sustained manner. These policies were based on a consensus between the
government and the partners in the labour market, whereas previous stabilisation
efforts relied on government decree. The experience of the previous inflation crisis
and the widespread use of indexation of household debt from the beginning of the
1980s contributed to this shift in attitudes.
The degree to which the devaluation bias was reduced during the 1988-1996
period is demonstrated in Table 3 below. Nominal devaluations during the period
were much smaller in relation to the size of the shocks than during preceding high
inflation periods, but achieved real depreciation much more efficiently.14
Table 3. Negative external shocks 1962-1996 and exchange rate behaviour
1967-68 1974-75 1979-80 1982 1988-92
(1) Cumulative % change in
real export revenue -20.0 -17.0 -4.7 -9.7 -13.6
(2) Inflation peak % 21.7 49.0 58.5 84.3 25.5
(3) Year of real exchange rate peak 1966 1974 1977 1981 1988
(4) Year of real exchange rate low 1969 1975 1980 1983 1994
(5) Real exchange rate % change
* -36.3 -21.9 -11.6 -13.9 -21.1
(6) Cumulative nominal depreciation
* 50.0 36.1 63.3 65.3 37.6
(7) Response ratio = -(6)/(1) 2.5 2.1 13.5 6.7 2.8
(8) Success ratio = -(5)/(6) 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6
The table shows periods of falling export revenue that occurred during 1962-1996. * Between years of
real exchange rate peaks and lows. Source: Andersen and Guðmundsson (1998).
2.4. An assessment of the success of Icelandic exchange rate policy during the 90s
The performance of exchange rate policy of the 1990s can be measured, on the one
hand, in terms of its success in bringing down inflation and its cost in terms of lost
output on the other. While the exchange rate based stabilisation measures taken during
the 1990s were quite successful in bringing down inflation, it is difficult to assess how
critical the role played by exchange rate policy was in the process. The question
remains whether alternative packages of policy measures could have yielded the same
results with similar or lesser cost. It should however be kept in mind that in the
beginning of the period, structural reforms had not reached the point of making some
alternative strategies, such as direct inflation targeting, a feasible option. A
functioning interbank market for foreign exchange did, for instance, not exist until
1993 and many other instrument of monetary control were at an early stage. Without
fully developed instruments of monetary policy it is difficult to see how other
strategies could have been pursued successfully at a lower cost.
The policy of a stable exchange rate was an important element of the economic
policies that were implemented in the late 1980s and the 1990s and succeeded in
bringing inflation down from a moderate level (between 15 to 30%) to the rate
prevailing in trading partner countries. The success in bringing down inflation,
however, cannot be ascribed only to exchange rate policy. Fiscal policy tightening in
late 1988 and tight financial conditions, as reflected in a continued high level of real
interest rates, also played a role in terms of preparing the ground for the onslaught
against inflation during the 1990s. An important aspect to note about the role played
by exchange rate policy is its interdependence with incomes policy. The economy-
wide wage settlement reached in February 1990 played a critical role in achieving
rapid disinflation. A crucial element of this settlement was its forward looking nature,
based on an inflation forecast and a fixed exchange rate. The settlement involved a
7% increase in wages at a time when inflation was running at about 20%. In15
subsequent settlements (in April 1992, May 1993 and February 1995) wage
moderation continued on the same basis. The consensus on wage moderation that
prevailed during this period was of course not only the result of the policy of
exchange rate stability, but reflected increasing concern by the labour unions about
rising unemployment.  Nevertheless, these results could hardly have been reached
without a commitment to exchange rate stability; indeed, it was an explicit part of the
February 1990 settlement.
One aspect of evaluating the success of the exchange-rate-based stabilisation
policies of the 1990s is to consider their short-term costs in terms of lost output
relative to the long-term gain in efficiency expected from lower inflation. This is not
an easy task in the case of Iceland, as output is highly affected by external shocks as
well as the stabilisation measure applied. In general, it is to be expected, according to
several international studies, that the cost of moving from moderate inflation to low
inflation is higher than the cost of moving from high inflation to moderate inflation.
According to Andersen and Guðmundsson (1998) the disinflation measures taken in
the mid 1980s were clearly accompanied by net gains. The output cost of the
disinflation measures taken during the 1990s seems to have been larger, but is still
small in international comparison. As output was also affected by adverse external
shocks during this period, the negative short-term impact of stabilisation may have
been smaller than it appears at first sight. One of the specific features of the Icelandic
economy, widespread use of financial indexation, probably reduced the cost of
disinflation resulting from expectation errors. As normally is the case, the decline in
inflation expectations in Iceland lagged considerably behind actual inflation during
the disinflation period of the 1990s (see Pétursson, 1997).
A related question is whether the exchange rate regime of the 1990s, vital as it
was in bringing inflation down to international levels, will also be the best in
maintaining that success, especially considering that the environment of exchange rate
policies has changed in a fundamental way following the full liberalisation of short
term capital movements in the beginning of 1995. How the existing regime would
weather a sever external shock with capital free to move out of the country is still
untested in Iceland, but the experience of several countries in recent years indicates
that the sustainability of exchange policies of intermediate flexibility could come
under heavy pressure.8
                                               
8 On the other hand, as the external environment has in some ways become more challenging, one can
argue that the authorities are at present endowed with more effective instruments of dealing with such
imbalances than before.16
These difficulties are reflected in recent trends in exchange rate arrangements
among IMF member countries.9 According to the new IMF classification scheme,10 in
1991 only 14% of the IMF member countries had a “hard” fixed exchange rate regime
in the form of having adopted another currency as legal tender or using a currency
board, whereas 53% had chosen a more conventional (formally or informally) “soft”
peg of a fixed but adjustable currency regime or a managed float with frequent
interventions. About 33% of the countries relied on an independent float or a managed
float with infrequent interventions. In 1999 25% of the countries had adopted a “hard”
fixed exchange rate regime, 35% relied on an intermediate regime and 41% chose an
independent float or a managed float with infrequent interventions. Thus, it is clear
that the trend is towards “harder” fixed exchange rate regimes or greater currency
flexibility.
2.5. Why an exchange rate target?
Why has Iceland chosen to target the exchange rate rather than opting for some other
form of anchor, such as an inflation target, monetary aggregates or nominal GDP (see
Guðmundsson, 1994)? A more flexible or a floating exchange rate would give the
monetary authorities more room of manoeuvre in terms of setting domestic interest
rates. However, given the ultimate goal of price stability and the strong link between
the exchange rate and the domestic price level in a small open economy, the room of
manoeuvre is not as large as it might appear at first sight. Indeed the close link
between the exchange rate and the price level is what makes exchange rate targeting
so attractive. No other variable that the monetary authorities may have at their
disposal has a comparably strong link with the price level. The reasons why Iceland
has chosen the exchange rate as a monetary anchor rather than targeting inflation
directly, nominal GDP or some monetary aggregate are thus much the same as in
other small open economies. The close link between exchange rates and the price
level, the transparency of the target, which makes it easily understood among the
public and politicians, make it very attractive as a monetary anchor.
                                               
9 This is also reflected in the literature. Many economists now argue that the polar regimes of free
floating or rigid pegs are the only regimes viable in today’s world of free capital movements with the
intermediate regimes no longer tenable, see Eichengreen (1999) and Frankel (1999). Mishkin (1999)
argues that this holds even more strongly for emerging markets, which are especially vulnerable to
financial fragility. For an alternative view, however, see Williamson (1999).
10 See IMF, “Exchange Rate Arrangements and Currency Convertibility – Developments and Issues”,
World Economic and Financial Surveys, 1999 and International Financial Statistics, August 1999.17
An alternative choice of a nominal anchor would be some monetary target, which
became popular in the 1970s in many countries. Although monetary targets have been
used successfully in some of them, like Germany and Switzerland, most countries
which tried monetary targeting, have now turned to some other nominal anchor,11
because monetary aggregates became less and less reliable indicators of nominal
income and inflation due to financial innovation.12 This breakdown in the short to
medium-term relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation indicates that
hitting the target does not ensure that the desired inflation will result.13 Hence, the
monetary target may not be a sufficiently good signal about the appropriate stance of
monetary policy. The problem of not hitting the announced target is, however, not a
major one for countries with highly credible central banks, such as Germany and
Switzerland, but could be a serious problem for countries trying to establish a credible
central bank, such as Iceland. For this reason, targeting monetary aggregates has been
considered untenable for Iceland.14
Although Pétursson (1998) has found a reasonable and stable demand function
for M3, it requires controlling for the effects of financial innovation on the
opportunity cost of money, changes which can be difficult to predict in the future. In
addition, other studies have found that the causation seems to run from prices to
money rather than the other way around (cf. G. Guðmundsson, 1994). The
explanation for this is probably the accommodating monetary policy followed in
Iceland for most of the period 1979-1993. Were money targeting to be adopted this
causation should be reversed. But the relationship might not even withstand the
regime shift and could break down completely. Despite the lack of information in
money on future inflation, M3 has been found to be a reasonably good indicator of
contemporaneous nominal GDP and is therefore considered an important indicator
variable for the conduct of monetary policy in Iceland.
                                               
11 On 10 December Switzerland became the latest country to adopt a formal inflation target.
Furthermore, as the target ranges, set by the German and Swiss central banks, for money growth were
missed about 50% of the time (Mishkin, 1999), one can argue that both countries have always had an
inflation target, albeit in disguise.
12 As the former governor of the Bank of Canada, Gerald Bouey, once said, “We didn’t abandon
monetary aggregates; they abandoned us”. Mishkin (1999).
13 Another potential problem with money targeting is that whereas the central bank can control narrow
money, it has much less control over broader measures of money. This makes money targeting very
difficult, especially in countries such as Iceland where money multipliers have been very unstable.18
Another alternative would be targeting nominal GDP, which could be seen as
attractive possibility due to its built-in countercyclical properties. The lag and
infrequent measurement of GDP, however, are serious drawbacks, even more so in
Iceland than in countries which produce national accounts on a quarterly basis.
Direct inflation targeting has in recent years become an increasingly attractive
option. At the beginning of the 1990s, however, targeting inflation and letting the
exchange rate float was not technically feasible due to the absence of a domestic
foreign exchange market and the underdeveloped stage of indirect monetary control.
Inflation targeting, however, has become an option in recent years that deserves
serious consideration, especially in view of the recent difficulties with rigid exchange
rate regimes and apparently positive experience with inflation targeting in
neighbouring countries. The market framework needed for such a policy to work
properly is now in place.
As mentioned, Iceland has resolved the conflict between the need for monetary
anchor, on the one hand, and the need for an instrument of adjustment in the event of
external shocks, on the other, by opting for a regime of a stable but adjustable
exchange rate. Under such a policy, deciding when and when not to adjust the
exchange rate is of critical importance. Too frequent or excessive adjustments will
undermine the credibility of such a policy. A discrete devaluation of the exchange rate
in response to an external shock might have adverse effects on inflation expectations
in an economy with a long history of inflation. Given the substantial degree of
uncertainty about the size and durability of external shocks when decisions are taken
on exchange rate adjustments, there is a risk of excessive reaction so that expectations
will adjust to a future path of exchange rates that ex post turns out to be excessively
low. If these expectations are validated, the real exchange rate will return to its long-
term equilibrium path when the impact of negative external shocks peter out, by
means of rising wages and prices rather than nominal readjustment. In that respect,
inflation targeting might be a more appropriate approach in an economy subject to
frequent external shocks that lead to shifts in the real equilibrium exchange rate. It
would provide a clear guidance for the policy makers as to how much adjustment
would be appropriate, weaken expectations of a permanent exchange rate adjustments
                                                                                                                                      
14 Furthermore, Svensson (1999) shows that money targeting is only the optimal intermediate-targeting
rule if money is the sole predictor of future inflation. Since this is not the case, money is in general not
the ideal intermediate target variable.19
and provide an mechanism to correct any misjudgement as to the size of external
shocks as soon it becomes apparent. Periods of over- and undervaluations of the
exchange rate could though still occur.
3. The Optimal Currency Area for Iceland
At least three issues need to be considered when choosing the appropriate exchange
rate regime for a country.15 First, it needs to be determined whether the structure of
the economy is more suitable for a fixed or a flexible exchange rate regime. Second,
whether the country can provide a framework for a credible monetary policy on its
own, or whether it needs to import credibility from outside sources. Finally, the
political motives for joining a currency area need to be considered.
The theory of optimal currency areas (OCA) (cf. Mundell, 1961), tries to organise
the economic considerations that motivate the choice of an exchange rate regime.
According to this theory a country is more suited to join a currency area:16
1. The more open the economy is and the more integrated it is with the proposed
currency area.
2. The more symmetric the shocks that impinge on the domestic economy and the
proposed currency area are.
3. The more flexible the domestic labour market is in terms of wage flexibility and
labour mobility.
The OCA theory therefore states that the more open a country is, the greater are
the net benefits of giving up an independent monetary policy to a common monetary
institute. The reason is twofold. First, tradable goods are an important part of the
overall price level in open economies. Nominal wages are therefore likely to be
strongly linked to the exchange rate in open economies through import and export
prices. An exchange rate devaluation will therefore have little effect on the real
exchange rate since the effects of the devaluation will transmit quickly to the domestic
price level and to nominal wages. Furthermore, as fixing the exchange rate in a more
open economy goes further toward fixing the inflation rate than in a less open
economies, a credible exchange rate peg is more likely to pin down inflation
                                               
15 Another important issue, not discussed here, is the extent of fiscal transfers within the monetary
union, which can speed up adjustment to asymmetric shocks by transferring purchasing power from
booming to depressed countries.
16 See Tavlas (1994) for a recent survey of the literature and Guðmundsson (1992) and Krugman
(1991) for an earlier analysis of the OCA criteria for Iceland.20
expectations. Second, transaction costs associated with international trade, such as the
cost of trading one currency for another, are reduced when the exchange rate is fixed.
As the importance of these transaction costs is likely to be proportional to the
openness of the country, a fixed exchange rate becomes more appropriate the more
open the economy is.
On the other hand, if the two economies are regularly hit by asymmetric supply or
demand shocks, an adjustment in relative prices between the two countries is the least
costly measure to restore equilibrium when prices and wages are sticky. Exchange
rate flexibility may speed up this adjustment. Furthermore, it is important to consider
whether shocks originate on the supply or demand side of the economy, see for
example Henderson (1979). When real supply shocks are the dominant source of
fluctuations in the domestic economy, a flexible exchange rate might be more
appropriate. If, however, financial shocks are more important, a fixed exchange rate
should be chosen.
The strain on monetary policy in the face of asymmetric shocks is considerably
lessened the greater the flexibility of the domestic labour market. In this case wage
flexibility or labour mobility may work as the adjustment mechanism instead of the
exchange rate. Thus, labour market flexibility reduces the need for an independent
monetary policy.
Despite some criticism (see, for example, Gros, 1996 and Section 4 in this paper),
the OCA theory has been the dominant framework for thinking about the choice of an
exchange rate regime for the last three decades. In the following section this
framework is therefore used to analyse the choice of an appropriate exchange rate
regime for Iceland.
3.1. Openness of the economy
The fact that the Icelandic economy is very small would immediately suggest that it is
too small to function as an independent currency area. The small size of the economy
would also suggest an open economy, measured in terms of the share of international
trade in aggregate activity. It turns out, however, that this is not necessarily the case.
Table 4 shows the share of international trade, measured as the sum of exports
and imports of traded goods and services as a percentage of GDP, for a group of
industrial countries. Two measures of a potential currency area are used. The first is
the EMU area containing Germany, France, Holland, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium,
Finland, Ireland, Austria, Portugal and Spain. The second is the EU area adding the
United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece and Sweden to the former group.21
Table 4. Openness of economies in 1997 (in %)
Countries Share of international trade Share of exports to the EU area
Austria 85.3 17.5
















United Kingdom 57.3 10.9
United States 25.0 1.7
Average for EU area 76.0 21.1
Average for EMU area 74.3 22.1
Simple average 70.1 18.7
The share of international trade is defined as imports and exports of goods and services as a percentage
of GDP. The share of exports to the EU area is defined as the share of exports of goods to the EU area
as a percentage of GDP. Sources:  Central Bank of Iceland: Hagtölur mánaðarins, January 1999 for
Iceland and IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics, September 1998 and IMF: International Financial
Statistics, February 1999 for the other countries.
Seven European countries have a larger share of international trade than Iceland,
with Iceland’s share approximately equal to the group’s average. The table also shows
the share of exports of goods to the EU area with Iceland again close to the group
average.
As Table 5 shows, only about 30% of Iceland’s total trade is with the EMU area,
whereas close to 60% is with the EU area. This suggests that the effects of EMU on
Iceland critically hinge on whether the four EU countries that have not joined EMU
will eventually join the union. This especially applies to the United Kingdom.
Tables 4 and 5 clearly indicate that although Iceland is a relatively open
economy, many European economies are more open. That Iceland is an “outlier”
regarding size and openness can be further seen by regressing the measure of
openness in Table 4 on population size (measured in millions). The relationship
between the two seems to be non-linear with larger countries less open on average,
but openness seems to decrease at a declining rate as countries become larger. 17
                                               
17 Heteroscedasticity consistent t-values are in parenthesis. A significant negative relation was still
found when only a linear term was included.22
Table 5. Share of countries in Icelandic trade 1997 (in %)
Country Goods Services Goods and services
Austria 0.4 0.4 0.4
Belgium & Luxembourg 1.7 0.9 1.5
Canada 1.1 1.0 1.1
Denmark 7.5 8.7 7.8
Finland 1.4 0.8 1.2
France 4.8 3.3 4.3
Germany 12.4 10.1 11.7
Greece 0.3 0.1 0.2
Holland 5.0 2.8 4.3
Ireland 0.7 0.7 0.7
Italy 2.5 1.1 2.1
Japan 5.7 1.4 4.5
Norway 8.7 4.5 7.5
Portugal 1.6 0.7 1.3
Spain 2.9 2.9 2.9
Sweden 4.0 3.5 3.9
Switzerland 2.6 1.6 2.3
United Kingdom 14.3 11.9 13.6
United States 11.6 39.2 19.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
EMU area 33.4 23.6 30.5
EU area 59.5 47.7 56.0
Source:  Central Bank of Iceland: Hagtölur mánaðarins, January 1999.
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According to these estimates, exports and imports as a ratio to GDP should be about
91% for Iceland instead of the actual 72%. Thus, Iceland seems to be less open than
its small size would suggest. It is therefore not clear whether Iceland fulfils the first
OCA criteria for joining the EMU or pegging the króna to the euro.
One of the reasons for this result is probably Iceland’s production structure. In
many other small European countries, imports of intermediate goods is an important
source of international trade, as these economies import intermediate goods and
export them as processed or final goods. This leads to large shares of imports and
exports of industrial goods. This “throughput” is much lower in Iceland’s case due to
its heavy reliance on natural resources as the main source of exports. Value added in23
the export sector as a share of GDP is therefore probably relatively higher than the
share of gross exports.18
3.2. Symmetry of aggregate fluctuations
The second OCA criterion argues that symmetry of fluctuations is an important
argument for a common currency. Tables 6 and 7 report correlations of key economic
variables in individual countries, on the one hand, and in the EU area, on the other,
finding little evidence of symmetry between Iceland and the EU area.19 The only
significant symmetry found is between the growth rate of export revenue. Table 7
shows, however, that this is mainly due to the oil shocks in the 1970s. For the period
after 1979 the symmetry is no longer significant.
From Tables 6 and 7 it appears that the two EFTA countries Norway and Iceland
seem to have little in common with the other European countries in terms of
fluctuations of economic aggregates. Furthermore, the tables show that output
fluctuations in Iceland have been larger than in the other countries studied. However,
these fluctuations have decreased in Iceland and at a faster rate than in the EU area. 20
                                               
18 The theoretically most accurate measure of openness would be value added in international trade as a
percentage of GDP. This measure is, however, not available.
19 In a study by the Central Bank of Iceland (1997), the same analysis was conducted for a “narrower”
EMU containing Germany, France, Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Finland, Ireland and Austria. The
correlations were even smaller than those reported here.
20 It should be emphasised that these results are robust to the particular measure of asymmetry used
here. For example, Guðmundsson and Harðarson (1992) get similar results using a spectral analysis.
They find no correlation between Iceland’s exports and aggregate output of 11 OECD countries.24
Table 6.  Symmetry of fluctuations with the EU area 1961-1995 (%)










Country fluctuations Fluctuations fluctuations fluctuations fluctuations fluctuations fluctuations fluctuations
Austria 1.9 49.5 3.7 71.9 4.2  50.2  3.8  51.3
Belgium 2.2 63.2 3.2 76.3  4.6  63.5  5.0  45.8
Denmark 2.3 63.1 8.0 71.6  2.8  36.1  3.4  53.3
Finland 3.2 34.3 4.5 35.9  6.3  27.6  6.2  32.9
France 2.0 71.2 10.5 83.1  4.5  57.9  5.4  78.3
Germany 2.2 66.9 6.2 30.9  4.1  56.5  4.1  53.4
Greece 3.6 44.9 6.2 51.3  8.1  3.6  8.8  13.9
Holland 2.4 62.6 2.7 60.0  4.0  66.9  4.3  67.1
Iceland 4.0 5.0 8.6 0.3  7.7  2.9  9.7  23.5
Ireland 2.2 6.9 7.2 52.0  4.5  4.3  6.0  29.2
Italy 2.5 45.8 9.2 70.0  4.9  26.7  5.8  36.4
Japan 3.4 53.2 22.5 77.2  7.2  26.6  8.6  32.0
Luxembourg 3.0 32.4 4.3 27.7  6.3  61.0  8.4  27.4
Norway 1.7 7.2 11.8 0.0  3.3  13.8  6.0  4.1
Portugal 3.3 45.6 8.6 36.5  9.9  11.8  11.1  38.9
Spain 3.0 54.1 12.1 18.8  12.3  14.3  14.2  32.5
Sweden 2.1 48.5 8.1 63.0  4.8  44.5  4.8  50.2
Switzerland 2.6 45.6 8.5 3.9  3.8  46.7  3.9  40.6
United Kingdom 2.1 48.9 5.1 12.3  3.6  61.5  3.3  42.3
United States 2.1 33.9 10.4 65.5  5.5  23.1  5.3  29.8
The total fluctuation of each variable is its standard deviation. Symmetry is defined as the percentage of the standard deviation explained by fluctuations in the EU area,
measured by R
2 from regressing each variable on the corresponding variable from the EU area. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 95% critical level. Source: Central
Bank of Iceland (1997).25









Output growth 1.7 4.0 5.0
Terms of trade 4.5 8.6 0.3
Export growth 2.9 7.7 3.0









Output growth 1.7 4.3 0.2
Terms of trade 3.7 11.2 0.0
Export growth 3.2 8.8 1.0









Output growth 1.3 3.3 5.6
Terms of trade 3.1 4.9 6.4
Export growth 2.1 6.3 3.0
Export revenue growth 2.4 8.1 10.0
See notes to Table 6. Source: Central Bank of Iceland (1997).
An important shortcoming of the above analysis is that no distinction is made
between underlying shocks and the propagation mechanism that follows. This
distinction is important since finding that aggregate variables in two countries move
together may either imply that the two countries experience the same shocks or that
factor mobility is working fast enough to offset differences in underlying shocks
hitting each country. Alternatively, the two countries may experience common shocks
but differences in their economic structure or in their policy responses may reduce the
co-movement in aggregate time series.21 It is therefore important to try to separate the
effects of the adjustment mechanism from the effects of the underlying shocks.
A standard approach to identifying underlying, structural shocks in economic
time series is to use a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models. This approach
can be used to identify structural shocks within countries which can then be compared
to evaluate the symmetry of shocks between countries, see e.g. Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1993) and Bergman (1999). The structural VAR approach can also be
used to evaluate which type of structural shocks are most common, another important
issue for designing an appropriate exchange rate regime.26
Symmetry of permanent and transitory shocks
In order to identify country-specific structural shocks in Iceland and the EU and to
measure the symmetry of these shocks, a structural VAR model along the lines of
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) is estimated. They use an identifying approach
based on Blanchard and Quah (1989), which imposes only long-run restrictions on
impulse response functions to identify shocks that have permanent and transitory
affects on output. These shocks are usually interpreted as supply and demand shocks
respectively, although this interpretation is questionable, as one can think of many
types of demand shocks that can have permanent effects, or at least persistent effects
that may be difficult to distinguish from truly permanent effects in finite data
samples.22 A minimum requirement for the demand and supply shock interpretation to
hold is that positive supply shocks lead to lower prices whereas positive demand
shocks lead to higher prices. This does not hold for Iceland since both types of shocks
lead to higher prices.23 One should therefore be careful in interpreting the permanent
shocks as supply shocks and the transitory shocks as demand shocks. However, as
discussed below, it turns out that a large part of the permanent shocks in Iceland are
truly supply shocks, originating from the economy’s fish resource and the terms of
trade. The supply and demand interpretation is therefore probably not too far off the
mark.
The structural VAR includes real output and consumer prices in Iceland and 19
other countries for the period 1960 to 1998 (annual data). This information set
identifies two structural shocks, by allowing one shock to have a permanent effect on
output and the other only a transitory one. The identifying approach is described in
more detail in Appendix B.24 Table 8 reports the correlation coefficients of permanent
and transitory shocks in Iceland and other countries. The results are very much in line
with those found in Table 6, with practically no correlation between shocks in Iceland
and the other countries. This result holds both for permanent and transitory shocks.
                                                                                                                                      
21 An example would be the responses to oil price shocks of net oil exporting countries, such as
Norway and the UK, and net oil importing countries.
22 As Blanchard and Quah (1989) point out, changes in the subjective discount rate and fiscal policy
may affect savings, and subsequently the long-run capital stock and output. Furthermore, in the
presence of increasing returns, learning-by-doing and hysteresis, demand shocks can have long-run
effects.
23 The same results are found for Norway, Japan, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Holland.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) get similar results for Norway and Ireland.
24 As in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) we estimate all the VAR models with 2 lags.27
Table 8. Correlation coefficients of underlying shocks between Iceland and other countries


















United Kingdom -0.02 0.05
United States -0.20 -0.06
European Union -0.06 0.15
Sources of shocks
Another important factor affecting a country’s choice of exchange rate regime is the
degree to which the domestic economy is insulated from various types of shocks.
Henderson (1979) analysis this question for an open economy with imperfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign assets. He shows that a flexible
exchange rate is the best exchange rate regime when the economy is hit by real
shocks, while a fixed rate is preferred when the economy is hit by financial shocks.
If shocks with permanent real effects are the main source of aggregate
fluctuations in Iceland, a flexible exchange rate would seem the most appropriate
exchange rate policy. When shocks alter the equilibrium real exchange rate an
adjustment of the exchange rate can be used to help restore internal and external
balance more quickly than any other instrument of adjustment.
To analyse whether permanent or transitory shocks are mainly responsible for
economic fluctuations in Iceland, and which type of permanent shocks are most
important, the structural VAR model above is altered to include output, investment,
consumption (all measured per capita), the terms of trade and fish catch.25 The
estimation period is 1950 to 1998. This data set allows identification of three
permanent shocks driving output, investment and consumption, with two remaining
                                               
25 An underlying economic model used to identify these shocks is described in Appendix A. The
econometric procedure for identifying the permanent shocks is described in Appendix B.28
transitory shocks. The three permanent shocks are interpreted as a terms of trade
shock, a resource shock and a domestic shock.26 The identification of these shocks is
obtained by assuming that the domestic shock has no long-run effect on fish catch and
the terms of trade, and that the terms of trade shock has no long-run effect on fish
catch. It has to be born in mind when interpreting the findings that the domestic shock
includes an amalgamation of factors like domestic productivity shocks but also
possibly domestic demand shocks with very persistent effects (e.g. some type of fiscal
shocks).
Table 9 decomposes the variation in the five variables at different forecast
horizons between the three permanent shocks, on the one hand, and between
permanent and transitory shocks, on the other. The forecast uncertainty in the fish
catch and the terms of trade are mainly due to their own shocks. The terms of trade
and domestic shocks are similarly important at short horizons for output variation, but
the importance of domestic shocks increases with the forecast horizon, accounting for
75% of the forecast uncertainty in output in the long run. For consumption and
investment, terms of trade shocks are most important at short horizons, but domestic
shocks become increasingly important as the horizon lengthens, accounting for 25%
of the variation in investment and 45% of the variation in consumption in the long
run.27
The table also decomposes the forecast uncertainty between the permanent and
transitory shocks. The results indicate that the forecast uncertainty in the data is
almost fully accounted for by the three permanent shocks, or 80 to 95% of the
variation at the one-year horizon. The two transitory shocks have almost no
significance, even in the short run. Only in the case of fish catch and investment is
there some evidence of significant effects of transitory shocks in the short run.
As discussed above it is not clear how much of the domestic shocks can be
attributed to supply shocks. Although many would argue that most, if not all,
permanent shocks to real variables are from the supply side, nothing in this analysis
precludes that an important element of the domestic shocks comes from the demand
                                               
26 The VAR model is estimated with 3 lags. Misspecification tests indicated no evidence of serial
correlation, heteroscedasticity or non-normality in the residuals. Cointegration tests indicated two
cointegrating vectors, as suggested by the underlying theoretical model. However, the long-run
restrictions implied by the model were rejected and the empirical vectors therefore used in the analysis
instead. These results are similar to the results in Mellander et al. (1992). The rejection of the
theoretical long-run relations does not, however, affect the identification of the permanent shocks as
pointed out by e.g. Warne (1993). One only needs to specify the number of cointegrating vectors for
identifying these shocks.
27 It is perhaps somewhat surprising that resource shocks are not more important to variations in output
than found here. The reason may be that the small data set used here makes it difficult to distinguish
between the three permanent shocks.29
side. The uncertainty in the interpretation of the domestic shocks is probably most
prominent in the short-term; in the long run, most of the domestic shocks are likely to
be domestic productivity shocks.
Table 9. Decomposition of structural shocks
Variable Shocks 1 year 2 years 5 years 10 years 20 years ¥
Catch Resource 0.464 0.618 0.744 0.853 0.920 1.000
Terms of trade 0.109 0.078 0.047 0.033 0.018 0.000
Domestic 0.216 0.139 0.126 0.067 0.036 0.000
Permanent 0.788 0.835 0.917 0.952 0.974 1.000
Transitory 0.212 0.165 0.083 0.048 0.026 0.000
Terms of trade Resource 0.107 0.109 0.053 0.032 0.019 0.001
Terms of trade 0.677 0.644 0.777 0.852 0.916 0.999
Domestic 0.064 0.185 0.126 0.088 0.050 0.000
Permanent 0.847 0.938 0.956 0.972 0.984 1.000
Transitory 0.153 0.062 0.044 0.028 0.016 0.000
Output Resource 0.018 0.158 0.210 0.143 0.108 0.078
Terms of trade 0.475 0.387 0.321 0.202 0.196 0.182
Domestic 0.340 0.356 0.400 0.618 0.678 0.740
Permanent 0.833 0.901 0.931 0.962 0.982 1.000
Transitory 0.017 0.099 0.069 0.038 0.018 0.000
Consumption Resource 0.129 0.078 0.062 0.029 0.014 0.001
Terms of trade 0.780 0.675 0.665 0.546 0.545 0.548
Domestic 0.046 0.210 0.216 0.396 0.427 0.451
Permanent 0.955 0.963 0.943 0.970 0.986 1.000
Transitory 0.045 0.037 0.057 0.030 0.014 0.000
Investment Resource 0.192 0.101 0.048 0.075 0.081 0.090
Terms of trade 0.602 0.688 0.682 0.591 0.624 0.660
Domestic 0.003 0.062 0.182 0.266 0.249 0.250
Permanent 0.797 0.851 0.912 0.932 0.955 1.000
Transitory 0.203 0.149 0.088 0.068 0.045 0.000
It is, however, clear that the resource and terms of trade shocks are true supply
shocks. They, therefore give an estimate of the lower bound for the importance of
supply shocks for the variation of aggregate variables. Thus, supply shocks explain at
least half of the variation in output, over 90% of the variation in consumption and
80% of the variation in investment at the one-year horizon. At the five-year horizon
the lower bound estimates range from over 50 to over 70%. As the forecast horizon
increases, domestic shocks become more important, especially for output. If one is
willing to accept that most of the domestic shocks in the long run are productivity
shocks, it becomes clear that supply shocks are indeed the dominant source of
economic fluctuations in Iceland at all horizons.30
Thus, permanent, or at least very persistent, real (supply) shocks account for most
of the fluctuations in output, investment and consumption, even in the short run.
These results are consistent with results from other countries. For example, King et al.
(1991) find that permanent shocks are very important for the US economy and
Gavosto and Pellegrini (1999), Mellander et al. (1992) and Bergman (1999) reach the
same conclusion for Italy, Sweden and the Scandinavian countries, respectively. The
results here imply that permanent, real (supply) shocks are even more important than
for those economies.
Taken together, our findings support the view that the Icelandic business cycle is
largely unconnected with the business cycle in other countries.28 The empirical results
suggest that the shocks hitting the Icelandic economy are mainly shocks that are not
shared by other countries. This implies that Iceland does not fulfil the second OCA
criteria for joining the EMU or pegging the króna to its currency. Furthermore, the
fact that the economy seems to be dominated by persistent real (supply) shocks, even
in the short run, implies that a flexible exchange rate is more appropriate than a fixed
rate.
3.3. Wage flexibility
According to the OCA criteria the more flexible the domestic labour market is in
terms of wage flexibility, the smaller is the cost of the loss of an independent
monetary policy. Instead of using the exchange rate to lower real wages in the face of
a negative shock, a decrease in nominal wages could be used. Thus, flexibility of
nominal wages can ease the strain on monetary policy when shocks impinge on the
economy. This would of course call for a downward flexibility of nominal wages, as
well as upward flexibility. However, a decrease in nominal wages has only happened
once in the last four decades (in 1959), which suggests that nominal wages have not
been downward flexible as is needed to fulfil the OCA criteria.
Real wages have, however, been very flexible in Iceland. This real wage
flexibility has been accomplished in spite of widespread wage indexation. Facing a
                                               
28 Hall et al. (1998) cannot reject that the “regular” cycles in Iceland and Europe are the same. They
obtain this result by testing whether the parameters in an AR(2) regression for output growth in Iceland
and Europe are the same. The problem with this approach is that it is not relevant for the policy issue at
hand. Two countries can have exactly identical AR parameters even though the business cycles in the
two countries are completely independent. Furthermore, the statistical power of this test is very low.
For short annual series, the AR parameters (especially the second one) are usually relatively poorly
determined, making it hard to reject that they are identical across countries. For example, when this
procedure is followed for Iceland and Ghana (to take a randomly chosen country), it could not be
rejected that the AR(2) parameters are the same (p-value = 0.19).31
negative shock, wage indexation was simply put aside and real wages decreased with
an exchange rate depreciation.
Table 10 compares real wage flexibility between countries. The standard
deviation of real wage growth is 7.7% in Iceland and is much higher than the standard
deviation of output growth. According to the table, real wage flexibility was greatest
in Iceland and in Portugal (measured as the ratio of standard deviation of real wage
and output growth). The table also shows that there is a strong correlation between
real wage growth in Iceland and current and previous two years output growth, not
only suggesting a strong connection between real wages and the state of the economy
but also that output growth leads real wage growth.






















Belgium 1.7 2.1 0.8 -0.057 0.571 0.328
Denmark 1.7 1.6 1.1 -0.102 0.129 0.295
Finland 1.7 3.5 0.5 0.45 0.599 0.374
France 1.8 1.4 1.3 0.004 -0.170 0.030
Germany 1.9 2.0 0.9 0.471 0.118 0.187
Holland 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.088 0.166 0.256
Iceland 7.7 3.0 2.6 0.673 0.470 0.581
Italy 1.8 1.3 1.4 -0.100 -0.070 0.031
Japan 1.3 1.8 0.7 0.447 0.075 0.350
Norway 2.1 2.0 1.1 0.349 0.417 0.174
Portugal 5.6 2.2 2.6 0.379 0.354 0.169
Spain 1.4 1.9 0.7 -0.291 -0.089 0.014
Sweden 2.4 1.9 1.3 0.619 0.199 0.411
Switzerland 1.9 1.4 1.4 0.008 -0.379 0.210
UK 1.3 2.1 0.6 0.493 -0.093 0.449
USA 0.9 1.9 0.5 -0.012 -0.145 0.022
Average 2.3 2.0 1.2 0.214 0.135 0.243
Dln(w/p)t denotes real wage growth and Dlnyt denotes output growth. Bold letters denote significant
correlations at the 95% critical level, i.e. where r[(T – 2)/(1 – r
2)]
1/2 is larger than a t-value with T – 2
degrees of freedom, where r is the correlation coefficient. Source: Central Bank of Iceland (1997).
It is, however, not clear whether nominal wages are flexible enough to take the
burden completely off monetary policy in face of major negative shocks.29 What is,
however, clear is that in a low inflation environment the kind of real wage flexibility
that has existed in Iceland in the past, requires more flexibility of nominal wages than
has been experienced. It is therefore highly unlikely that real wage flexibility can play
                                               
29 A fall in nominal wage growth in the face of smaller productivity shocks could though be sufficient
to keep the growth of unit labour cost consistent with the inflation target.32
the same role in the adjustment process in the future as in the past and that Iceland
cannot be expected to fulfil this OCA criteria within the current low inflation regime.
3.4. Labour mobility
The final OCA criteria states that the more mobile labour is the less critical is the
availability of an independent monetary policy, since adjustment to exogenous shocks
can take place through reallocation of labour instead of trough changes in the
exchange rate.30 The costs of migration imply, however, that labour mobility is a more
plausible mechanism for adjusting to permanent shocks rather than temporary shocks.
Due to the geographical location of Iceland and the language barrier, labour
mobility, especially in to the country, has not been so great as to make an important
difference in the adjustment to exogenous shocks. There has been some movement of
labour out of the country during recessions, especially to the other Nordic countries.
This relatively low mobility of labour might, however, be changing in the wake of
Iceland’s membership in the EEA, that implies free movement of labour vis-à-vis EU
countries, and with the opening up of the East European labour market. This has
resulted in an increased import of a highly mobile foreign labour during the current
upswing.
To give an idea of the effects of the business cycle on labour mobility in Iceland,
the net emigration per 1,000 inhabitants (nt) was regressed on the past year’s output
growth for the period 1962 to 1997. The resulting regression gave (t-values in
parenthesis)
1 ) 4 . 2 ( 1 ) 8 . 2 ( ) 0 . 3 ( 348 . 0 ln 290 . 0 862 . 1 - - + D - = t t t n y n
OLS, T = 36, R
2 = 0.29, SE = 2.5%
Previous year’s output growth therefore reduces net emigration significantly. A 1%
permanent reduction in output growth leads to a net outflow of 0.03% of the total
population in the following year and a permanent net emigration of 0.045% of the
population in the long run. In terms of the current population in Iceland (280
thousand) this implies a net outflow of 80 people the year after the output shock and
125 people in the long run. A temporary shock to output growth has no long-run
                                               
30 The mobility of financial capital can also substitute for exchange rate flexibility. For example, in
Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993) agents diversify away the risk of country-specific shocks by holding
financial assets with returns uncorrelated with country-specific sources of labour and capital income
shocks. Capital mobility can, however, only serve as an imperfect substitute for labour mobility except
under restrictive assumptions, as noted by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993).33
effects on net emigration. More than half the number of people who move out of the
country in the year of the recession will return the year after although the full
adjustment to the new steady state can take up to nine years from the initial shock to
output growth.31
Turning to the domestic labour market, changes in labour participation and hours
worked offer an additional source of flexibility. During the stagnation period from
1988 to 1995 the labour participation rate fell from over 80% to 76% and average
working hours of skilled and unskilled workers fell by approximately two hours per
week. Thus, the labour market responded to stagnating activity with reduced labour
participation and fewer hours worked, preventing unemployment from rising more
than it actually did. For example, if labour participation and average hours had
remained stable at the 1980-1995 average, the unemployment rate would have risen to
about 7% instead of the actual 5% at the bottom of the recession in 1995. However,
one can argue that labour market adjustment through the participation rate and hours
worked is in practice akin to changes in the unemployment rate in the sense that they
involve, at least partly, involuntary aspects and is therefore not fully optimal as an
adjustment mechanism.
Together, these results imply that although the effects of the business cycle on
labour mobility are significant they are still too small numerically to be of critical
importance for the adjustment mechanism in the face of shocks to the Icelandic
economy within a time span relevant for monetary policy. This OCA criterion does
therefore not seem to be fulfilled by Iceland. Again, it should be emphasised that
these results might be changing and might change dramatically if an independent
monetary policy was not available to reduce the short-term effects of adverse shocks.
4. Limitations of the OCA criteria
The OCA literature concentrates on the macroeconomic costs of fixed exchange rates,
while more or less overlooking the potential microeconomic benefits of a single
currency. These mainly involve the reduction of transaction costs and price
uncertainty that follow from the use of separate currencies in international trade.32 To
the extent that these factors reduce trade, there will be fewer gains from economic
specialisation. The reason that the potential microeconomic benefits are so often
                                               
31 Similar results are obtained by Hall et al. (1998) in a simulation exercise.
32 Although one might expect that the importance of these costs would decline with increasing
financial innovation, they should not be discounted altogether. For example, McCallum (1995) finds
that trade among Canadian provinces is substantially greater than trade between Canadian provinces
and nearby US states. The most important explanation for this seems to be that the Canadian provinces
share a common currency.34
overlooked is simply that economists have found modelling them exceedingly
difficult (cf. Krugman, 1995). That does not, however, imply that they are less
important than the macroeconomic costs of a common currency.
Furthermore, several authors have questioned the relevance of the OCA criteria
for a successful monetary union (cf. Flandreau, 1995). For example, the Scandinavian
currency union (which Iceland was a part of) from 1873 to 1913 has been called “the
most successful of all European currency unions” (de Cecco, 1992 p. 67), even though
intra-Scandinavian trade was relatively unimportant, labour mobility was relatively
small, and the economic structure of the participant countries differed considerably
(Bergman, 1999). In addition Bergman (1999) finds that country-specific shocks in
the Scandinavian countries were not highly symmetric during this period, leading him
to conclude that the Scandinavian countries did not form an optimal currency area
according to the OCA criteria.
Finally, there are several important issues that the OCA criteria do not
satisfactorily address. These include the important role of fixed exchange rates as a
nominal anchor for countries lacking credibility in monetary policy, the possibility
that flexible exchange rates overshoot and become an independent source of economic
fluctuations rather than an important tool of adjustment to shocks, and the time
dependence of the OCA criteria and its dependence on the policy framework. We now
turn to each of these limitations.
4.1. Credibility of monetary policy
Although the OCA criteria indicate that Iceland would benefit from a flexible
exchange rate regime, there may be other aspects that have to be considered when a
decision is made concerning Iceland’s future exchange rate arrangements. The OCA
approach assumes that economic policies, under a flexible exchange rate regime, are
pursued in an optimum way such as to make full use of the potential benefits of
flexible exchange rates. If monetary independence is not applied in an optimum way
or is abused it may result in an erosion of credibility which makes monetary
independence quite costly. Under those circumstances the constraints that a
membership in a monetary union (or a credibly fixed exchange rate if such an ideal
arrangement exists) puts on these policies may still make a monetary union preferable
to an independent currency. It should be noted in this context that when the OCA
criteria are applied to identify the optimum exchange rate arrangement, no distinction
is usually made between participation in a fully-fledged monetary union and a
unilateral fixed exchange rate. This distinction is, however, critical as a unilateral peg
can never be fully credible. Hence, the actual results of these two options can be35
vastly different. Neither does the OCA criteria provide answers as to the appropriate
degree of flexibility. Considering that completely free floating hardly exists (although
the main currencies come close) and that all forms of a pegged exchange rate are
adjustable to some degree, the OCA criteria do not provide a precise answer to the
question of whether Iceland’s existing exchange rate arrangement is indeed optimal or
not.
Recent history provides examples of both a sub-optimal and a constructive use of
monetary independence. The inflationary bias of the 1970s and 1980s can be
contrasted to the use of monetary independence during the 1990s to relieve the
negative effects of external shocks on employment. The inflationary bias in monetary
policy in the past, especially in the 1980s, probably caused substantial damage to the
credibility of monetary policy. Although it can be argued that in the 1990s the use of
the exchange rate as a monetary anchor and an instrument of adjustment was balanced
quite successfully, interest rates are still considerably higher in Iceland than in other
European countries. This is partly because Iceland is in a different phase of the
business cycle than other European countries, but high interest rates also reflect a risk
premium, which partly measures the price of keeping an independent currency. This
cost of an independent monetary policy in terms of a high interest rate premium can
obviously have detrimental effects on investment and growth in the long run, which
will offset some of the gains from speedy adjustment.33 This cost should however
decline as the credibility of monetary policy increases. This, and the different
monetary policy options available are discussed in Section 6 below.
4.2. Uncertainty and incomplete foreign exchange markets
The credibility deficit may not always come as a result of bad policies. In some cases
it may result from the inefficiency of markets in evaluating changes in a highly
uncertain external environment. The problem of uncertainty and herd behaviour in
expectations driven foreign exchange and capital markets is not explicitly addressed
by the OCA approach, but may substantially reduce the benefits of monetary
independence.34
There is, however, a growing literature addressing this issue (see Coleman, 1999
for a survey). For example, Neumeyer (1998) shows that if exchange rates are more
volatile than justified by economic fundamentals (as empirical evidence clearly
suggests), an independent currency may be a source of economic shocks, rather than
                                               
33 Exchange rate uncertainty may also affect investment and growth via other channels such as the
location of industrial activity, as discussed below.
34 Many economists, such as Williamson (1999), have used this argument against floating regimes.36
the ideal mean of adjustment to shocks, by introducing additional random noise into
prices. Hence, if the foreign exchange market is incomplete, an independent currency
may have destabilising effects on the economy. Joining a monetary union can
therefore be welfare improving, by insulating the real economy from speculative
bubbles originating in foreign exchange markets.
Furthermore, if foreign exchange and capital markets are indeed prone to
overshooting, monetary authorities may actually be forced to tighten monetary policy
at a time when easing (resulting in a measured depreciation) would be more
appropriate considering the economic conditions. This problem has been clearly
demonstrated during the recent crisis in emerging markets, and hotly debated in the
context of IMF programs. Thus, although a flexible exchange rate regime does
provide protection against one-way speculation, such a regime is not immune from
destabilising speculation and overshooting originating in foreign exchange markets.
4.3. The endogeneity of the OCA criteria
A further shortcoming of the OCA criteria is that they fall victim to the Lucas
critique. As argued by Frankel and Rose (1998), the extent of trade between countries
and business cycle correlation will critically depend on each country’s policy choices,
including its choice of exchange rate regime. Thus, participation in a monetary union
may in itself change the structure of the economy in such a way that a country may
qualify for a monetary union membership ex post even when not ex ante.
This view has, however, been challenged by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993)
and Krugman (1993). They argue that greater trade integration will lead to
concentration and specialisation of manufacturing industries, thus reducing income
correlations. If this effect were to dominate, participation in a monetary union would
actually move Iceland further away from the OCA criteria.
Theoretically, trade integration thus has an ambiguous effect on business cycle
correlations, so empirical evidence is required to determine which effect dominates.
Frankel and Rose (1998) provide such evidence for 21 industrial countries over the
period 1959 to 1993. They find that there is a significant positive effect from trade
integration on income correlations, suggesting that increased trade integration leads to
more correlated business cycles. Further evidence is provided by Frankel and Wei
(1995), using a gravity model of bilateral trade, who find that membership in the EU
increases trade with other EU members by at least 60%.
It thus appears that joining a monetary union increases trade with other union
members, and that increased trade integration leads to more symmetric business
cycles. This implies that although historical evidence suggests that Iceland does not37
satisfy the OCA criteria, increased trade with the EU countries and, subsequently,
increased income correlations with the EU area might result in Iceland satisfying the
criteria in the future.
5. EMU and the króna
5.1. Economic impact on Iceland
Whether the establishment of EMU will lead to significant long-term benefits in terms
of growth and stability and how these benefits weigh against the risk of disruptions, if
the monetary union proves less successful than hoped, is uncertain. But assuming that
EMU will be successfully implemented, it should contribute to growth and stability,
not only within the euro-zone, but also in countries that are highly integrated with the
euro-zone. Some of the most important benefits are the following:
1. With one currency replacing eleven currencies, transaction costs in foreign trade
and tourism will decline.
2. Any growth benefits that might flow from EMU will also accrue to outsiders,
depending on their share of trade with the EMU countries. For a small country
with a relatively low overall market penetration the benefits are, however, likely
to be modest.
3. Outsiders will also benefit from reduced costs of financial transactions due to
deeper and more liquid financial markets in the euro area.
4. The end of uncertainty in inter-euro area exchange rates that has presented risk in
foreign exchange transactions and trade with individual euro-zone countries will
also benefit outsiders.
5. The Maastricht criteria have become the standard for economic policies not only
within the euro-zone and among prospective members but among outsiders too.
Icelandic policy makers, as well as foreign observers, frequently judge the success
of economic policies against these criteria. Interest rates offered to Icelandic
borrowers on international financial markets might be influenced by Iceland’s
standing with respect to the criteria and credit rating agencies might make
adherence to them a requirement for favourable credit ratings. In view of the
above and the possibility that Iceland might at some stage join the EU, these
criteria are likely to affect economic policies in Iceland in the coming years. In
that sense EMU will affect the economic policies of outsiders, irrespective of the
exchange rate arrangements or relationship to the euro they choose.38
The benefits that accrue to outsiders will in all cases be smaller than those that
will accrue to insiders, but larger the bigger the euro-area. Later on the euro-zone
could embrace all present members of the EU plus the countries of Eastern Europe
and the Baltic. In the case of a wide-EMU, including all the present 15 EU members,
the share of EMU countries in Iceland’s merchandise trade would rise to 60% (see
Table 2 above). Among industrial countries, the potential accession of Britain, which
is Iceland’s largest export market, with a share of merchandise exports of around
20%, matters most. It would profoundly affect the relevance of EMU for Iceland as
well as Norway.
There might also, however, be negative aspects facing outsiders. Firstly, the
country’s position in terms of relative living standards might deteriorate vis-à-vis
insiders as the benefits accrue disproportionally to the insiders. Secondly, there might
be an increasing tendency by multinational firms to locate their activities in Europe
within the euro-zone in order to minimise exchange rate risk. This might put outsider
countries at a disadvantage in terms of attracting foreign direct investment. Thirdly,
the interest rate margin of outsiders against their trading partners might widen
temporarily as interest rates in high interest rate insider countries converge to the core
rates. Fourthly, small countries at the margin of a big currency area might find it
difficult to maintain stable exchange rates with free capital movements. Fifthly, the
competitive position of financial institutions in outsider countries with respect to
financial institutions within the euro-zone might be adversely affected. Finally, there
is the possibility of some currency substitution, especially among the smallest
outsiders, with adverse effects on seigniorage.
6. Options for future exchange rate policy
The results so far can be summarised in the following way:
• Iceland is a candidate for a flexible exchange rate arrangement based on the
structural characteristics of the economy as captured by the OCA criteria.
• In spite of this Iceland has adopted a stable exchange rate policy as the
intermediate target of monetary policy. The reasons were a lack of an alternative
nominal anchor and a market structure permitting a floating exchange rate. A
stable exchange rate was also a very important part of the disinflation strategy.
• The apparent conflict between what the OCA criteria seem to suggest and the
adopted framework has in practice been resolved by devaluations in the past and
more flexibility of the exchange rate within a wider band in recent years. The39
actual flexibility has thus been substantial, notwithstanding formal commitment to
a stable exchange rate.
• EMU will affect the Icelandic economy in various ways, as Iceland is a close
trading partner with the EU and a part of the internal market through the EEA
agreement. But these effects will be much stronger if all EU members enter the
euro area, as the euro area only accounts for a third of Iceland’s foreign trade in
goods and services, whereas the EU as a whole accounts for 60%.35
We can now use these results to assess the following options for Iceland’s future
exchange rate policy:
• Maintain the current arrangement.
• Adopt an explicit inflation target with a floating exchange rate.
• Peg to the euro, either unilaterally or under a bilateral agreement.
• Adopt the euro as a legal tender without being a full member of EMU.
• Join the EMU.
The assessment of the costs and benefits of these options will be mostly
qualitative as information for making quantitative evaluation is in many cases lacking.
We will compare various cost and benefit aspects of these options, using the current
system as a benchmark.
The first is the interest rate differential towards trading partners that has to be
sustained on average over the business cycle in order keep inflation at the trading
partners level over the medium term. The size of this differential will of course at any
given time depend on the credibility of monetary policy. But apart from that it can be
seen as an insurance premium that has to be paid for having an independent currency
with the option of using monetary policy to facilitate the adjustment to asymmetric
shocks. The smaller this differential the better is the given exchange rate arrangement,
all other things being equal. The second aspect to be considered is the degree of
flexibility or inflexibility in the face of shocks or adverse developments. An exchange
rate arrangement that makes it possible to speed the adjustment to external shocks is
to be preferred over one that does not, all other things being equal. The third aspect is
the degree of vulnerability to external adverse developments. The increasing
                                               
35 If we further add the EFTA countries the share goes to 70%. These countries are closely integrated
with the EU through the EEA-agreement (Norway) and bilateral treaties (Switzerland) but have
formally a flexible exchange arrangement towards the euro. Their share in Iceland’s foreign trade is
therefore not an argument for pegging to the euro, as long as that is the case. On policy options for
EFTA-countries vis-à-vis the euro see Guðmundsson (1999).40
international mobility of capital, which has made unilateral exchange rate pegs more
vulnerable to speculative attacks, has made this an increasingly important question.
The fourth aspect has to do with transaction costs. These involve both “pure”
transactions costs associated with using two or more currencies in foreign trade and
uncertainty created by the possibility of changes in exchange rates. The fifth and final
aspect has to do with the degree of sovereignty. It is taken for granted that the less the
loss of sovereignty the better, all other things being equal. But a distinction should be
made between sharing sovereignty and delegating sovereignty to a foreign country.
Participation in a monetary union with some say in the monetary policy pursued by
that union is preferred over using the currency of that union as a legal tender with no
say, provided that everything else is equal. Under this heading we include also the
issue of command over seigniorage.
6.1. The current arrangement
The current arrangement has in many ways served Iceland well. The stable exchange
rate policy played a big role in the disinflation process and it has so far survived free
capital movements and a strong economic upswing. That is partly due to the
flexibility, albeit limited, of the arrangement.36 On the cost side we can list the high
interest rate differential that seems to be needed and the vulnerability in an
environment of free capital movements. The underlying problem is that a flexible
exchange rate is more in agreement with the structural characteristics of the Icelandic
economy, which makes it less credible that Iceland will, at least unilaterally, sustain a
fixed exchange regime. Substantial flexibility can and has been achieved by adjusting
the exchange rate whenever deemed appropriate. The fundamental problem, however,
is how a policy of stable exchange rate can be implemented in a flexible way without
leading to a devaluation bias that will undermine the credibility of the peg.
6.2. An inflation target
There are two reasons why Iceland did not adopt a flexible exchange rate in spite of
the structural characteristics of the economy. These were a lack of an alternative
                                               
36 The flexibility of the current arrangement is twofold. Firstly, the króna is pegged to a trade-weighted
basket with the weights being changed annually on the basis of the last year’s trade composition.
Secondly, there is a ±6% fluctuation band. But the flexibility implied by the band was hardly used until
the last couple of years. The króna fluctuated within the old ±2¼% band until 14 May 1998. Recently,
the width of the band has, however, been used more extensively with the króna deep in the strong part
of the band (about 4½% at the end of January 2000). Since the June 1993 devaluation the króna has
been at a low 1½% into the weak part of the band and a high just under 5% into the strong part of the
band.41
nominal anchor and a lack of markets sufficiently developed for a floating exchange
rate. The end of the disinflation process, growing international experience with direct
inflation targeting and the development of the money and foreign exchange markets
has made inflation targeting a more attractive option. It is superior to the current
arrangement in terms of flexibility and vulnerability. But it has to be supplemented
with a full instrument independence of the Central Bank in order to maximise the
likelihood that the use of the flexibility is not at the cost of medium-term price
stability. Such independence will in turn call for other changes, especially regarding
transparency of the whole framework and the accountability of the Central Bank. On
the cost side, this framework might increase transactions costs due to more exchange
rate volatility. However, it is not clear if it will bring any significant benefit in terms
of the interest rate differential. Having the potential of being more credible than the
current arrangement might suggest that it would, but increased exchange rate
volatility will work in the other direction. But as the benefits are clear and the costs
are mostly associated with exchange rate volatility it seems preferable to the current
arrangement, especially considering the difficulties the current regime might
experience in the face of external shocks under full capital mobility.37
6.3. Euro-peg
There are three degrees to an euro-peg, i.e. a traditional unilateral peg, a bilateral peg
and a currency board.
The traditional unilateral peg suffers from all the drawbacks of unilateral pegs
with free capital movements. There are no obvious benefits in terms of credibility and
the gain in terms of a lower interest rate differential will be small, non-existent or
even negative if markets perceive the peg to be more vulnerable than the present one
due to the risk of misalignment as the peg would not reflect Iceland’s trade patterns.
Hence, it would be particularly problematic for Iceland to peg to the euro so long as
the euro area only accounts for a third of Iceland’s foreign trade. The Asian
experience shows clearly that “wrong” pegs can be dangerous when countries are
faced with significant changes in the exchange rates of major trading partners. This
option can thus be excluded.
                                               
37 Gerlach (1998) uses a probit model to identify structural factors that influence the probability that
countries will adopt an explicit inflation target. These seem to be low central bank independence prior
to the introduction of the inflation target, relatively low degree of openness and relatively few export
goods, but those countries are more likely to be subject to external shocks and changes in the
equilibrium real exchange rate. The fitted (out-of-sample) probabilities that Iceland and Norway are
using an explicit inflation target are both practically unity.42
The bilateral peg is a more promising option, as credibility will be enhanced to
the extent that the ECB would be willing to defend the peg. The gain in terms of a
lower interest rate differential could therefore be significant. But it is difficult to
evaluate this possibility at present, as exchange rate relations of the euro area with
close third countries have not been defined. The EEA agreement does not cover
monetary and exchange rate arrangements, but article 46 of the agreement opens up
the possibility of exchanging information and viewpoints on these issues, though
without any commitment. But it is somewhat contradictory to claim that monetary
union is a very important complement to the internal market (some say even a
necessary addition) while, at the same time, accepting that those countries, which,
through the EEA agreement, are part of that market, could in principle have very
flexible exchange rates towards the euro area. The legal provisions in the Maastricht
Treaty seem to indicate that ERM2 will not be open for non-EU countries. Formal
exchange rate arrangements involving non-EU currencies will be governed by article
109(1) of the Maastricht Treaty, which makes it clear that it will be the responsibility
of the Council, acting on recommendations from the ECB and the Commission, after
having consulted the ECB and the European Parliament, to conclude such agreements.
This process of making a bilateral agreement of supporting a peg of the Icelandic
króna to the euro is somewhat cumbersome, although such an agreement cannot be
excluded. An agreement with the ECB on limited intervention support is another and
possibly an easier variant. It is though not clear if it would enhance credibility to the
same degree.
This raises the question as to why insiders should be interested in providing
institutional arrangements for bilateral pegs for outsiders. Honohan (1997) argues that
the existence of outsiders that are strongly integrated with certain insiders and face
similar kind of shocks could make the problem of asymmetric shocks even worse for
these insiders and thus be a potential threat to a monetary union. He goes on to
propose soft target zones with a flexible intervention support from the ECB in these
cases.
A currency board is of course a unilateral peg, but with a much stronger internal
commitment mechanism. It is therefore likely that it will bring benefits in terms of the
interest rate differential.38 The problems are possible strains on the banking system
and the absence of the lender-of-last-resort function of the Central Bank. It is also to
be considered that currency boards have usually been adopted by colonies, newly
independent countries in the process of establishing their own currency, or countries
                                               
38 The interest rate differential need not disappear due to credit and equity risks as Argentina’s
experience shows.43
that have very severe problems with inflation, financial instability and a lack of
credibility. Currency boards have, to our knowledge, not been adopted by relatively
successful and independent developed countries.
6.4. Unilaterally adopting the euro as a legal tender
The unilateral use of the euro as a legal tender involves the full euroisation of the
economy as in Panama vis-à-vis the US dollar and as has been contemplated by
Argentina and recently adopted by Ecuador as the “last means” for bringing the
financial crisis to an end.39 The practical arrangement of such a transition has not been
fully thought out and there is a question as to what degree a consent of the euro
authorities is necessary and advisable.40 It is also an open question whether lender-of-
last-resort facilities for the banking system would be available and who would be
providing those. In any case, it is hard to see that a full euroisation of the Icelandic
economy would be practical until such time as euro notes and coins come into
circulation.41
The main benefits of full euroisation would be reduced transaction costs, smaller
exchange rate risk and a lower interest rate differential. There will, of course, be no
scope for an independent monetary policy but, at the same time, there is no exchange
rate vulnerability. The vulnerability of the financial system is, however, likely to
increase. From the standpoint of sovereignty it is problematic that the country will
have no say in monetary policy decisions. Moreover seigniorage will accrue to other
countries and they will benefit and the country in question will loose if notes and
coins get lost or destroyed although, by the same token, the country will not bear the
cost of producing notes and coins. Therefore, the same applies as regarding the
currency board, that this is not a road that has been taken by relatively successful and
independent developed countries.
6.5. Participation in EMU
Finally, we want to compare the options we have discussed so far with the option of
joining EMU. This is not, of course, an available option to Iceland at present as it is
not a member of the EU. It seems to us that EMU membership would be preferable to
                                               
39 See Hanke and Schuler (1999) for an interesting discussion.
40 It is though clear that it would involve using the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank to
swap the monetary base into euros. As the numbers were at the end of 1998 it is a viable option as the
monetary base was 20.6 bn.kr. (of which 6.3 bn.kr. are notes and coins) but gross reserves of the
Central Bank were 29.8 bn.kr. and net foreign assets of the Central Bank stood at 26.1 bn.kr.
41 Icelandic residents are free to open foreign exchange accounts in domestic banks. At the end of 1998
such accounts stood at 15 bn.kr. or 6.7% of total deposits.44
both a currency board arrangement and the unilateral use of the euro as a legal tender.
All benefits of the latter concerning exchange rate risk and interest rate differential
will accrue. It will also be superior in terms of vulnerability and sovereignty. But the
issue of the role of the ECB as a guardian of the stability of the financial system and
as a lender-of-last-resort is presently unresolved. The country would get its share of
the seigniorage of the euro and what is more important, it would be part of the
decision process on monetary policy. On policy flexibility in the face of shocks, it can
be argued that EMU membership is inferior to the unilateral use of the euro as a legal
tender as fiscal policy would be subject to the strictures of the Stability and Growth
Pact.42 Finally, this alternative seems to be superior to euroisation in terms of the cost
of the transition. In the case of euroisation, Iceland would have to use its foreign
exchange reserves to swap the monetary base for euros. By joining EMU only a part
of the foreign exchange reserves would be handed over to the ECB. Hence it may be
unwise to adopt the euro as a legal tender if participation of EMU might be on the
agenda in the not too distant future.
6.6. Comparison of the options
We conclude this section by attempting to rank the options we have discussed above
in terms of the five criteria. In Table 11 we try to put signs on the net benefits relative
to the current arrangement. It goes without saying that this is very far from being an
exact science and some of the signs (or question marks) are debatable. Some of the
signs flow from the discussion above but further explanations are also called for. Most
of the question marks are in the column for vulnerability. At first sight it might seem
that a bilateral euro peg should clearly be less vulnerable than the current arrangement
as it would be defended by the ECB as well as the Central Bank of Iceland. But it
would be more vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations of the major international
currencies than the current arrangement so long as Iceland has a significant trade with
the US, the UK and Asian countries. These fluctuations could in that case cause
fluctuations in the effective exchange rate and/or the terms of trade. The currency
board and euroisation options have question marks in the vulnerability column for the
same reasons, but also due to more exposure of the financial system. The question
marks in the interest rate differential column are explained in the text above.
                                               
42 This drawback might be less than it seems as the bigger room of manoeuvre for fiscal policy is not
necessarily always used wisely.45






Inflation target ? + + – 0
Unilateral euro peg ? 0 – 0 0
Bilateral euro peg + – ? 0 0
Currency board + – ? + 0
Euroisation + – ? + –
EMU + – + + –
In Table 12 we try to assess the relative ranking of selected options in terms of
the five criteria. No attempt is made to weigh the various aspects. We leave out three
options, i.e. the current arrangement, a unilateral euro peg and the currency board.
The current arrangement is left out, as we want to assess its main alternatives. But it is
clear that the current arrangement would not be the most favoured option on any of
the criteria, except regarding sovereignty, where it has an equal rank with a bilateral
euro peg, the currency board and the inflation target. It clearly emerges from Table 11
that a unilateral euro peg is inferior to all the other options and therefore of no interest
for the exercise in Table 12. The currency board option is left out in order to simplify
the table, but it is a weaker case of the more theoretically interesting euroisation, with
a small probability of being adopted. The currency board option is not the most
favoured option on any of the criteria, except sovereignty.43
Table 12. Relative ranking of selective options in terms of net benefits
Criteria Statements Results
Interest rate differential IT < BEP < ELT = EMU ELT or EMU are preferred
Flexibility EMU < ELT < BEP < IT IT is preferred
Vulnerability IT – ? – EMU; BEP & ELT < IT & EMU IT or EMU preferred
Transaction costs IT < BEP < ELT < EMU EMU is preferred
Sovereignty ELT < EMU < BEP = IT BEP or IT preferred
IT = inflation target, BEP = bilateral euro peg, ELT = euro as a legal tender (euroisation), EMU =
Economic and Monetary Union.
The inflation target is preferred in three cases and EMU membership in three, but
the other two options only in one case each. But if EMU membership is excluded then
inflation targeting would be preferred in three cases and euroisation in two, thus,
making the inflation target the most favoured option.
                                               
43 The currency board option would be ranked below euroisation in terms of the interest rate
differential, but it is not clear whether it would be better than a bilateral euro peg. It would rank
between euroisation and a bilateral euro peg on flexibility, would be inferior to an inflation target,
EMU membership and euroisation on vulnerability, between a bilateral euro peg and euroisation on
transaction costs and equal to a bilateral euro peg and an inflation target on sovereignty.46
We have seen that there is no single answer concerning the optimal exchange rate
regime that is given for all times. Rather, the optimal exchange rate regime for a
country depends on the options that are open in any given period, which in turn
depend on the historical development of the economy and the economies of its trading
partners (see Frankel, 1999 for similar arguments). The same will apply in the future.
We can therefore think of several scenarios for the development of the framework for
monetary policy. One scenario, which seems though rather unlikely at the moment, is
that the possibility of Iceland’s membership in EU and later EMU opens up relatively
soon. In that case it is conceivable that Iceland could live with the current
arrangement until it enters a bilateral euro peg (ERM2) and then eventually becomes a
full member of EMU. Another scenario is that Iceland moves to an inflation target in
the near future as Poland and the Czech Republic have done. That does not though
preclude that it could, at a later date, become member of EMU if Iceland was to
decide to enter the EU.
The question of moving to an inflation target raises the issue of what is called the
exit problem in the literature (see Eichengreen, 1999). It seems that countries do not
usually move to increase the flexibility of their exchange regimes until forced to do so
by crises. It is clearly optimal to move before. It also seems desirable to move
gradually, and when the currency is not under any strong downward pressure. In
Iceland’s case we could envisage that the first step would be to use the formal
flexibility that is implied by the fluctuation band to a greater extend. An increase in
the width of the band and more explicit reference to the implicit inflation target could
then follow. Finally, the formal bands could be removed and a transparent inflation
target regime adopted. That then leaves the final question of whether the Icelandic
economy is really big enough to make it optimal for it to sustain an independent
monetary regime.44
7. Conclusions
This paper analysis the appropriate exchange rate arrangement for Iceland, given its
structural characteristics, on the one hand, and the need for a framework for monetary
policy that enhances the credibility of the goal of low inflation, on the other. It also
discusses the rationale for the choice of the current regime of a currency peg, and how
successful it has been in achieving its goals. The paper then tries to explain how the
apparent conflict between the exchange rate arrangement suggested by the structural
                                               
44 In this connection it is interesting that a discussion seems to have begun in the New Zealand
economic establishment about the drawbacks of monetary independence and the possible benefits of
entering a monetary union. See Coleman (1999).47
characteristics of the economy and the arrangement actually chosen, has been
resolved. Finally, the paper suggests and analyses alternative options that are available
for future arrangement of monetary policy.
The findings suggest that the structural characteristics of the economy all support
a flexible exchange rate regime. The economy is not so open that the transaction costs
of keeping an independent currency are overwhelmingly large, nor is trade with the
potential currency area large enough to warrant pegging the króna to the euro. The
main sources of aggregate fluctuations in Iceland are persistent, real supply shocks
that are largely uncorrelated with business cycles in other countries. Finally, it is
argued that wage flexibility and labour mobility cannot be expected to take the burden
completely off monetary policy in the face of external shocks. It seems therefore that
Iceland fails to fulfil all, or most, of the optimal currency area (OCA) criteria for a
successful euro-peg. That is not to say that joining the euro is necessarily a bad idea.
That depends on whether the extra room of manoeuvre provided by a flexible
exchange rate regime will be used wisely or not. Furthermore, if exchange rates are
excessively volatile, an independent currency may have destabilising effects on the
economy, in which case a monetary union membership might be welfare improving.
It is one of the conclusions of the paper that there is no single time independent
answer to the question of the optimal exchange rate regime. Although historical
evidence suggests that Iceland may not fulfil the OCA criteria, it might be that
increased trade with the EU area following EU membership will lead to increased
business cycle symmetries. Hence, Iceland may fulfil the OCA criteria ex post even
when not ex ante.
The paper also discusses possible future monetary policy options for Iceland.
Considering the long-run vulnerability of the current regime (and other unilateral
pegs) and the fact that any forms of bilateral agreement with EMU or full EMU
membership are rather unlikely at present, it is argued that an inflation target might
offer more flexibility and credibility than the current regime and be more consistent
with the structural characteristics of the Icelandic economy. But the more general
question about the optimality for Iceland of sustaining an independent monetary
regime is still unanswered.48
Appendix A. A Simple Open Economy Growth Model
To motivate the number and structure of the long-run relations in Section 3.2, a
simple open economy extension of the real business cycle model in King et al. (1991)
is used, containing output (yt), consumption (ct), investment (it), fish catch (at) and the
terms of trade (qt). This model follows Mellander et al. (1992) but allows for two
types of productivity shocks: a domestic productivity shock and a resource shock.
As in Mellander et al. (1992) the analysis is conducted in a steady state where all
stationary disturbances in the system are equal to their expected, zero, values. The
first steady state relationship states that along a balanced growth path the output-
investment ratio should be constant.
To show this, assume that the home country’s output, y, is produced by means of
a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale. There are three factors of
production, labour and two types of goods: one produced at home and abroad and one
that is only produced abroad. The capital stocks for these two goods are denoted as kh
and kf, respectively. Normalising labour input to unity, the production function can be
written as
(A.1)
b a l f h k k y ) ( =
where l is total factor productivity, which consists of two independent trends
(A.2)




where ld is a domestic productivity trend and lr is a resource trend. Letting the price
of the h-good act as numeraire, maximisation of (A.1) subject to costs yields the
following first-order condition for the allocation of the two capital stocks
(A.3) h f k q k ) / ( a b =
where q is the terms of trade. Under a zero-profit condition, y is given by
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where u is a constant. Output is therefore driven by the two trends in l and the terms
of trade trend, q.49
Total investment is given by
(A.5) ) / )( ( / q k k q i i i f h f h + + = + = d g
where g is the average growth rate of output and d is the rate of depreciation. The
steady-state value for investment is thus
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where j is a constant. Thus, the three trends that drive output are also driving
investment. Equations (A.4) and (A.6) further imply that
(A.7) ) / ln( ln ln j u = - i y
i.e. the output-investment ratio is constant along a balanced growth path. As
deviations from this steady state value must be stationary, the output-investment ratio
will be stationary.
The second steady state relation implied by the open economy growth model is
between output and consumption. The consumer maximises utility U(c), where c
denotes aggregate consumption c = (ch, cf), subject to a budget constraint. The
consumption index c is given as
(A.8)
q q - =
1
f hc c c
where q denotes the share of the h-good in aggregate consumption. The solution to the
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where J is a constant. It therefore follows that
(A.10) ) / ln( ln ) 1 ( ln ln J u q = - + - q c y50
Thus, in steady state the output-consumption ratio, adjusted for the terms of trade,
should be stationary. Note that this degenerates to the closed economy case analysed
in King et al. (1991) when q = 1 or if q is stationary.
Accordingly, this simple model suggests that output, investment and consumption
are all driven by the three common stochastic trends ldt, lrt and qt with two
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Appendix B. Identification of Permanent and Transitory Shocks
The structural VAR model
To identify the permanent and transitory shocks and the main sources of these shocks,
a structural VAR approach is used. This approach can briefly be explained as follows.
Let xt denote a n · 1 vector of variables of interest at time t. Assume that the true
underlying structural relationship between the growth rates of xt, Dxt, can be given a
vector moving average representation
(B.1) t t L C x e r ) ( + = D
where L is the lag operator,  ￿ + =
¥
=1 0 ) ( j
j
jL C C L C  and et is the vector of the n
structural shocks, with E(et) = 0 and  I E t t = ¢) ( e e .45 There are assumed to be two types
of structural shocks, k · 1 “permanent” shocks, 
P
t e , and r · 1 (with k + r = n)
“transitory” shocks, 
T
t e , with C(1) formulated such that 
T
t e  only affects real variables
in the short run but both types of shocks can effect nominal variables in the long run.
If there are fewer permanent shocks than variables, the variables in xt are
cointegrated. Hence, there will be a reduced number of independent trends driving the
system, with the number of cointegrating vectors determining the number of these
trends. Thus, C(1) will have reduced rank k and  0 ) 1 ( = ¢C b  where b is a n · r matrix
containing the r cointegrating vectors.
                                               
45 The important assumption here is that of a diagonal covariance matrix which makes it meaningful to
interpret the innovations as structural disturbances. The assumption of an identity covariance matrix is
simply an immaterial normalisation.51
By recursive substitution, the structural model in (B.1) can be rewritten in a
common trends form (see King et al., 1991) 46
(B.2) t t t L C C x e x ) ( ) 1 (
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i j j i C C . The n-dimensional vector xt is a random
walk with drift given as
(B.3) t t t e x d x + + = -1
where d = C(1)r.
The reduced rank property of C(1) makes it possible to write C(1) as a product of
two rectangular matrices, a n · k matrix Y and a k · n matrix J, satisfying YJ = C(1),
with J constructed such that it picks out the permanent shocks from et, 
P
t t J e e = .  The
k permanent trends driving the system can then be written as
(B.4)
P
t t t e t m t + + = -1
where m = Jd and  t t Jx t = . The structural model can then be written as
(B.5) t t t L C x e t ) (
* + Y =
Estimation and identification
To estimate and identify the structural shocks a corresponding reduced form model is
used to calculate the n · k values of Y
(B.6) t t t e L A A x ) ( ) 1 (
* + = z
where et is the vector of one-step-ahead linear forecast errors in xt given information
on lagged values of xt, with E(et) = 0 and  S = ¢) ( t te e E , and the n-dimensional vector zt
is a random walk with drift given as
(B.7) t t t e + + = -1 z a z
                                               
46 Initial values are set to zero to simplify the notation.52
First note that cointegration imposes (n – k)k restrictions on the nk elements of Y
since b´Y=0. This leaves k
2 restrictions left to just identify Y. These can be derived
from
(B.8) ) ( ) ( ¢ S = Y¢ Y = Y¢ ¢ Y 1 1 A A J J
Given A(1), which has rank k, and S, equation (B.8) gives k(k + 1)/2 additional
restrictions on Y. Hence, to just identify Y additional k(k – 1)/2 restrictions need to be
imposed. These are analogous to the identifying assumptions in standard structural
VAR models, such as Sims (1986), except that they are imposed on the long-run
rather than on the contemporaneous correlations and have to be consistent with the
pattern of cointegration.
To impose these final restrictions, King et al. (1991) suggest writing Y as Y0p,
where Y0 is a n · k matrix with parameters chosen such that b´Y0 = 0, and where the
free parameters of Y are lumped into the k · k matrix p. To determine the remaining
k(k – 1)/2 parameters they suggest using a Choleski decomposition of p, which will
give the remaining restrictions to just identify Y.
A simple bivariate model of permanent and transitory shocks
The simple bivariate model used by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) uses output
growth and inflation to identify permanent and transitory shocks, by imposing the
restriction that permanent shocks are those which only affect output in the long run.
This model is based on the long-run restrictions approach suggested by Blanchard and
Quah (1989).
This can also be framed in the identification scheme suggested by King et al.
(1991), by assuming that  ) ln , (ln ¢ D = t t t p y x , implying that output and prices are non-
stationary and that inflation is stationary.47 In this case the cointegration vector is











































                                               
47 These assumptions are supported by unit root tests. The results are available upon request.53
Identifying the sources of permanent shocks
In the simple open economy growth model in Appendix A, n = 5 and r = 2. There are
therefore k = 3 common trends driving the model. The cointegrating vectors are given
as in (A.11), imposing (n – k)k = 6 restrictions on the nk = 15 elements of Y. The
estimate of the long-run covariance matrix of xt gives k(k + 1)/2 = 6 additional
restrictions, having 3 additional restrictions to be imposed.
Since the stochastic trends are assumed to represent a resource trend (trt), a terms
of trade trend (tqt) and a domestic trend (tdt), it seems natural to assume that shocks to
the domestic trend do not have long-run effects on the two other trends and that
shocks to the terms of trade trend do not have long-run affects on the resource trend.
This provides the three additional restrictions needed for identification. The three



































































































































































































t 1 e  and 
T
t 2 e  are the two transitory shocks.54
Appendix C. The Data
Table C.1. Data description and sources
Data Description Period Source
Most
recent data
Consumption Total private consumption at
1990 prices




Current account Trade of goods and services,
excluding transfers






3 and 12 month Treasury bill
rates
W: 3. Jan. 96




Trade weighted average of króna
price of foreign currency
A: 1961-98 CBI Hagtölur
mánaðarins
Export revenue Exports of goods and services in
current prices, deflated by import
prices




Fish catch Volume index of fish catch at
constant prices






Consumer prices and GDP at
constant prices




Weighted average of 3 and 12
month money market rates from
16 countries
W: 3. Jan. 96








Immigration Net emigration per 1,000
inhabitants
A: 1961-97 Landshagir
Prices Annual averages of the consumer
price index
A: 1961-98 CBI Hagtölur
mánaðarins
Investment Total private investment at 1990
prices






Trade weighted average of króna
price of foreign currency
M: 1/90-3/99
W: 3. Jan. 96
- 7. Apr. 99
CBI Hagtölur
mánaðarins





Index, 1980 = 100





Terms of trade Terms of trade of goods and
services














Vacancy rate Number of vacancies as a
percentage of total workforce
A: 1985-98 Fréttabréf
Þjóðhagsstofnunar
Wages Weighted average of hourly
earnings of skilled and unskilled
production workers
A: 1962-98 Fréttabréf Kjara-
rannsóknarnefndar
Hagtölur mánaðarins is published by the CBI. Sögulegt yfirlit hagtalna, Þjóðarbúskapurinn and
Fréttabréf Þjóðhagsstofnunar are published by the NEI. Tölfræðihandbókin 1974 and Landshagir are
published by SI. Fréttabréf Kjararannsóknarnefndar is published by the Institute of Labour Market
Research. Abbreviations: CBI: Central Bank of Iceland, NEI: National Economic Institute, SI:
Statistics Iceland, A: Annual data, M: Monthly data, W: Weekly data.55
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